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ABOLISHING THE SUICIDE RULE 
Alex B. Long 
ABSTRACT—Suicide is increasingly recognized as a public health issue. 
There are over 40,000 suicides a year in the U.S., making suicide the tenth-
leading cause of death in the country. But societal attitudes on the subject 
remain decidedly mixed. Suicide is often closely linked to mental illness, a 
condition that continues to involve stigma and often triggers irrational fears 
and misunderstanding. For many, suicide remains an immoral act that flies 
in the face of strongly held religious principles. In some ways, tort law’s 
treatment of suicide mirrors the conflicting societal views regarding suicide. 
Tort law has long been reluctant to permit recovery in a wrongful death 
action from a defendant who is alleged to have caused the suicide of the 
decedent. In many instances, courts apply a strict rule of causation in suicide 
cases that has actually been dubbed “the suicide rule” in one jurisdiction. 
While reluctance to assign liability to defendants whose actions are alleged 
to have resulted in suicide still remains the norm in negligence cases, there 
has been a slight trend among court decisions away from singling out suicide 
cases for special treatment and toward an analytical framework that more 
closely follows traditional tort law principles. This Article argues that this 
trend is to be encouraged and that it is time for courts to largely abandon the 
special rules that have developed in suicide cases that treat suicide as a 
superseding cause of a decedent’s death.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Suicide has been a controversial topic for centuries. But in recent years, 
the subject has garnered increased public attention. A 2018 study released 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that 
suicide rates increased in nearly every state between 1999 and 2016.1 Suicide 
rates increased by over 30% in half of the states during this timeframe.2 
While the suicide rate has increased for almost every age group,3 suicide 
is the second-leading cause of death among people between the ages of 10 
and 24.4 The suicide rate for girls in particular between the ages of 10 and 14 
has doubled over the past decade.5 Media reports of school and cyber 
 
 1 Deborah M. Stone et al., Vital Signs: Trends in State Suicide Rates — United States, 1999–2016 
and Circumstances Contributing to Suicide — 27 States, 2015, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 617, 617 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm6722a1.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
NR98-CE7T]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. at 618 (noting that suicide rates increased for every age group under the age of 75). 
 4 Laura Kann et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance — United States, 2015, 65 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 2 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/ss/ss6506a1.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/CHT5-YSJB]. 
 5 The group with the second highest increase in the suicide rate is men between the ages of 45 and 
64 (43%). See SALLY C. CURTIN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STAT. DATA BRIEF: INCREASE IN SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2014, at 3 (2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db241.htm [https://perma.cc/QD69-NLXH]. 
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bullying resulting in suicide have increasingly horrified Americans.6 
According to a 2015 report from the CDC involving high school students, 
“15.5% had been electronically bullied, 20.2% had been bullied on school 
property, and 8.6% had attempted suicide.”7 
Suicide is increasingly recognized as a public health issue.8 There are 
over 40,000 suicides a year in the United States, making suicide the tenth-
leading cause of death in the country.9 Roughly 18% of those who commit 
suicide are veterans,10 and the Department of Veterans Affairs estimates that 
twenty veterans commit suicide every day.11 The risk of suicide cuts across 
 
 6 See Samantha Schmidt, After Months of Bullying, Her Parents Say, A 12-Year-Old New Jersey Girl 
Killed Herself. They Blame the School., WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/08/02/after-months-of-bullying-a-12-year-old-new-jersey-girl-killed-
herself-her-parents-blame-the-school [https://perma.cc/9A5K-4Q5C]. The case of Michelle Carter, who 
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for encouraging her friend to commit suicide through a series 
of texts, shocked the public in 2017. Katharine Q. Seelye & Jess Bidgood, Guilty Verdict for Young 
Woman Who Urged Friend to Kill Himself, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/suicide-texting-trial-michelle-carter-conrad-roy.html 
[https://perma.cc/92ZA-GSWS]. 
 7 Kann et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
 8 Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Suicide Rate Surges to a 30-Year High, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/health/us-suicide-rate-surges-to-a-30-year-high.html 
[https://perma.cc/37FN-AMAT]. 
 9 Melonie Heron, Deaths: Leading Causes for 2014, 65 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 1 (2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65_05.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FWL-AAB5]; Gregg 
Zoroya, 40,000 Suicides Annually, Yet America Simply Shrugs, USA TODAY, (published Oct. 9, 2014, 
3:39 PM; updated Oct. 10, 2014, 9:45 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/09/ 
suicide-mental-health-prevention-research/15276353 [https://perma.cc/QYJ2-RVUF]. 
 10  OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA Research on Suicide 
Prevention, https://www.research.va.gov/topics/suicide.cfm [https://perma.cc/E2YX-BA4Y]. 
 11 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA Suicide Prevention Program: Facts About Veteran Suicide 
(July 2016), https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/ 
Suicide_Prevention_FactSheet_New_VA_Stats_070616_1400.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3EL-JTY5]. 
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any number of demographic lines, including race/ethnicity,12 socioeconomic 
status,13 and sexual orientation.14 
Just as the risk of suicide cuts across demographic lines, societal 
attitudes toward suicide are remarkably heterogeneous. Several studies have 
shown disparities between men and women when it comes to their views as 
to the acceptability of suicide.15 Geographic, socioeconomic, political, and 
religious differences have also been shown to influence attitudes toward 
suicide.16 
One reason for this divergence of views is that suicide raises 
complicated and deeply personal issues. Suicide is often closely linked to 
mental illness,17 a condition that continues to attract stigma and often triggers 
 
 12 American Indians and Alaska Natives have the highest suicide rate in the United States, followed 
by Caucasians. The rate among African Americans is significantly lower. AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE 
PREVENTION, Suicide Statistics, https://afsp.org/about-suicide/suicide-statistics [https://perma.cc/ 
7AMM-PESH] (citing CDC numbers). 
 13 According to a World Health Organization study, “75 percent of suicides occur in low- and middle-
income countries.” See Tanya Basu, The New Demographics of Suicide, ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/the-new-demographics-of-suicide/379961 
[https://perma.cc/33ZM-HMK9] (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG., PREVENTING SUICIDE: A GLOBAL 
IMPERATIVE 11 (2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/131056/ 
9789241564779_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3BD-NUB4]). One study of suicides in Fulton County, 
Georgia, found that those who committed suicide “tended to live in lower income areas compared with 
the general population of Fulton County.” David C. Purselle et al., Differential Association of 
Socioeconomic Status in Ethnic and Age-Defined Suicides, 167 PSYCHIATRY RES. 258, 260 (2009). 
 14 See Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious 
Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 223 (2008) 
(summarizing studies showing greater incidence and risk of suicide among LGBT youth); Stephen T. 
Russell & Kara Joyner, Adolescent Sexual Orientation and Suicide Risk: Evidence From a National 
Study, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1276, 1278 (2001) (reporting results of survey finding “that youths with 
same-sex orientation are more than 2 times more likely than their same-sex peers to attempt suicide”); 
Jamiles Lartey, Risk of Poverty and Suicide Far Higher Among Transgender People, Survey Finds, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2016, 3:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/dec/08/transgender-
survey-suicide-poverty-unemployment-mental-health [https://perma.cc/HA66-276C] (reporting results 
of survey finding that 40% of transgender individuals surveyed “said they had attempted suicide in their 
life, almost nine times the US overall attempted suicide rate”). 
 15 Judith M. Stillion & Bethany D. Stillion, Attitudes Toward Suicide: Past, Present and Future, 
38 OMEGA 77, 81–82 (1999). 
 16 Id. at 82–83. Age may also play a role. See Benedict Carey, How Suicide Quietly Morphed into a 
Public Health Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/health/suicide-
spade-bordain-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/XDB5-ETNG] (quoting physician as saying that “[w]e are 
seeing somewhat more tolerant attitudes toward suicide” among younger people). 
 17 One frequently cited statistic is that 90% of suicide cases involve mental illness. Zoroya, supra 
note 9. This figure remains subject to dispute. See SUSAN STEFAN, RATIONAL SUICIDE, IRRATIONAL 
LAWS 101 (2016) (stating that this figure is “based on bad science, and the best researchers and most 
famous suicidologists acknowledge it”). But the research does suggest that those with mental health issues 
have higher rates of suicide than the general population. See OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2012 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION: GOALS AND 
OBJECTIVES FOR ACTION 101 (2012), https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/national-strategy-
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irrational fears and misunderstandings.18 For many, suicide remains an 
immoral act that flies in the face of strongly held religious principles.19 
Others simply view those who die by suicide as being selfish or weak.20 Still 
others view suicide as a tragic and preventable outcome,21 or in some 
instances, a matter of rational, individual choice.22 
In some ways, tort law’s treatment of suicide mirrors the conflicting 
societal views regarding suicide. Tort law has long been reluctant to permit 
recovery in a wrongful death action from a defendant who is alleged to have 
caused the suicide of the decedent. In many instances, courts apply a strict 
rule of causation in suicide cases that has actually been dubbed “the suicide 
rule” in one jurisdiction.23 Courts have rested their conclusions on a variety 
of grounds, but many of the decisions reveal a fundamental unease with the 
idea of assigning responsibility to defendants in such cases.24 This is true 
even where the defendant is alleged to have engaged in intentional 
 
suicide-prevention/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/65X4-6GCT] (listing those with mental health 
conditions as being at greater risk of suicide); Jennifer M. Boggs et al., General Medical, Mental Health, 
and Demographic Risk Factors Associated with Suicide by Firearm Compared with Other Means, 
69 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 677, 679 (2018) (reporting results of study finding that 61% of suicide deaths 
involved at least one mental disorder, “with the highest prevalence for alcohol use, anxiety, depression, 
and sleep disorders,” and that over half of suicides studied involved individuals who had a psychiatric 
disorder diagnosed in the year prior to suicide death). 
 18 See Susan D. Carle, Analyzing Social Impairments Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1109, 1172 (2017) (noting that “persons with social impairments [including 
mental illness] face the problem of stigma”); John V. Jacobi, Mental Illness: Access and Freedom, 
16 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 37, 39 (2016) (noting the historical stigmatization of people with mental 
disorders and the accompanying consequences); Debbie N. Kaminer, Mentally Ill Employees in the 
Workplace: Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection?, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 205, 
217 (2016) (discussing the perception among some that mental illness is a character defect); Wayne 
Edward Ramage, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental Health Care, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
951, 951 (1992) (“Anglo-American society historically has viewed the mentally ill as outsiders.”); 
Elizabeth A. McGuan, Note, New Standards for the Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill: 
“Danger” Redefined, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 181, 184 (2009) (“To be labeled ‘mentally ill’ means 
to be included in a group that has been viewed with aversion and fear throughout history.”). 
 19 See Stillion & Stillion, supra note 15, at 80 (“Some voices still speak of suicide as sin . . . .”). 
 20 See Stephanie Chandler, Please Don’t Give Up, WASH. POST (June 8, 2018), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/opinions/please-dont-give-up/2018/06/08/b3cb84aa-6b42-11e8-bf8c-f9ed2e672 
adf_story.html [https://perma.cc/6YYL-5JG8] (noting the view among some that suicide is a selfish act). 
 21 Karl Rove, My Mom’s Suicide Was Preventable, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2018, 6:30 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-moms-suicide-was-preventable-1528929056 [https://perma.cc/V4UB-
NNJX]. 
 22 See Stillion & Stillion, supra note 15, at 80 (“[O]thers view it as a rational, individual choice, 
perhaps even a right.”); Paula Span, A Debate Over ‘Rational Suicide,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018), 
www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/health/suicide-elderly.html [https://perma.cc/P8XN-V8U2] (discussing 
the notion of “rational suicide” in the context of suicide among older adults). 
 23 See infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
 24 See generally STEFAN, supra note 17, at 12–13 (“The law has always assumed that people are 
legally responsible for their suicides and suicide attempts . . . .”). 
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wrongdoing as opposed to mere negligence and in some cases where the 
defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress.25 As this Article 
explains, this majority approach to wrongful death cases involving suicide 
reflects a straight line from nineteenth-century American judicial decisions, 
which themselves have as their origin English law from the Middle Ages.26 
These older decisions are based on the then-prevailing views regarding 
morality and mental illness. While reluctance to assign liability to defendants 
whose actions are alleged to have resulted in suicide still remains the norm 
in negligence cases, there has been a slight trend among court decisions away 
from singling out suicide cases for special treatment and toward an analytical 
framework that more closely follows traditional tort law principles.27 
This Article argues that this trend is to be encouraged and that it is time 
for courts to largely abandon the special rules that have developed in suicide 
cases that mechanically treat suicide as a superseding cause of a decedent’s 
death. Part I describes the historical views regarding suicide in Europe dating 
back to the Middle Ages that helped to shape American attitudes and law. 
Part II discusses tort law’s treatment of suicide, most notably the special 
rules regarding proximate cause and insanity that have developed in 
negligence cases. Drawing upon studies into the causes and predictors of 
suicide, Part III analyzes the shortcomings of these special rules. Finally, 
Part IV argues for an approach based on traditional tort law principles that 
recognizes suicide as a public health problem while also taking into account 
the special nature of suicide. 
I. HISTORICAL SOCIETAL VIEWS REGARDING SUICIDE 
Societal views regarding suicide are ever-changing. The ancient Greeks 
were divided as to the acceptability of the practice.28 Roman attitudes were 
generally more favorable, but still divided.29 As societal attitudes toward 
suicide have changed over time, so too has the law regarding the subject. The 
following Part examines the evolving societal and legal views on the subject 
of suicide to the present. 
 
 25 See infra notes 193–232 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 78–104 & 115–23 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 310–61 and accompanying text. 
 28 See GEORGE MINOIS, HISTORY OF SUICIDE: VOLUNTARY DEATH IN WESTERN CULTURE 43–46 
(Lydia G. Cochrane trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999) (1995) (summarizing competing schools of 
thought). 
 29 Id. at 46–47. 
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A. Societal Views on Suicide and Mental Illness in England Through 
the Enlightenment 
1. The Middle Ages 
During the Middle Ages, suicide was viewed “as the result of diabolic 
temptation induced by despair or as mad behavior.”30 Accordingly, one who 
took his own life was subject to public scorn.31 The corpse of the decedent 
was subjected to such punishments as being dragged through the streets, 
tortured, or hanged.32 Popular plays and works of fiction of the era portrayed 
suicide as sinful and “the result of a despair inspired by the devil.”33 Those 
who committed suicide were, in the words of St. Bruno, “Satan’s martyrs.”34 
Religion heavily influenced societal views regarding suicide during this 
time. The biblical commandment “Thou shalt not kill” provided the basis for 
Christianity’s strong condemnation of suicide.35 St. Augustine’s book The 
City of God, published in the fifth century, took an unequivocal stance 
against suicide.36 According to Augustine, suicide was never justified, 
whether it be the result of a desire “to escape from temporal difficulties” or 
to avoid rape.37 Augustine’s work influenced the Christian edicts that 
followed, including the denial of Christian burial rites for those who 
committed suicide and the excommunication of those who attempted 
suicide.38 Writing in the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas explained 
that since life is a gift from God, “God alone has authority to decide about 
life and death.”39 Suicide, then, amounted to an offense against God.40 
 
 30 Id. at 9. 
 31 Interestingly, class played a role in how suicide was viewed, according to one account. A noble’s 
suicide, “whether he sacrificed himself for the cause he was defending or killed himself for love, in a fit 
of anger, or because he was afflicted by madness, was seen as altruistic. In all cases, it was excusable.” 
Id. at 16. In contrast, the peasant’s suicide was viewed as an act “born of egotism and cowardice” and an 
attempt to escape his responsibilities. Id. 
 32 Id. at 7. In one case, the decedent’s body was ordered to be carried “to some cross way” and have 
a stake driven through her breast and buried so that the stake could be seen as a warning to others against 
suicide. HOWARD I. KUSHNER, SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE PROMISED LAND: A PSYCHOCULTURAL 
BIOLOGY OF AMERICAN SUICIDE 18–19 (1989). 
 33 MINOIS, supra note 28, at 13. 
 34 Id. at 32. 
 35 See id. at 27. 
 36 See id.; GEORGE HOWE COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE 157 (1991). 
 37 MINOIS, supra note 28, at 27–28 (quoting ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, BOOKS I–IV, at 61 
(Demetrius B. Zema & Gerald G. Walsh trans., Fathers of the Church 1950)). 
 38 See COLT, supra note 36, at 158. 
 39 Id. at 159 (quoting 38 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: INJUSTICE 33 (Marcus 
Lefébure ed. & trans., Blackfriars 1975)). 
 40 See id. 
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At the time, the act of suicide was often attributed to insanity, with the 
decedent having succumbed to melancholia or “frenesy” (frenzy).41 But 
mental illness itself was also closely linked to sin in medieval thinking. In 
the early Middle Ages, mental illness was often viewed as the result of 
sinfulness or demonic possession.42 And even into the later Middle Ages, 
mental illness was sometimes attributed to possession.43 
During the later Middle Ages, mental illness was usually attributed to 
physiological causes.44 The prevailing theory was that there were four 
humours—blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile—that influenced 
human behavior. An abnormality in any of them could produce mental 
disorder. For example, black bile was associated with melancholy, so an 
excess of black bile could produce what today would most likely be 
diagnosed as schizophrenia or depression.45 “Frenzy” was caused by yellow 
bile, resulting in an overheating of the brain.46 Treatment ranged from herbal 
remedies to exorcism.47 
2. The Enlightenment 
The idea that the devil was responsible for suicide was still somewhat 
common at the dawn of the eighteenth century.48 But European attitudes 
toward suicide were also gradually evolving and loosening somewhat around 
 
 41 MINOIS, supra note 28, at 38. 
 42 See id. at 30 (“In the Anglo-Saxon penitentials of the eighth and ninth centuries, only the insane 
or the possessed are excused from punishment for suicide, and then only if they had lived honorably 
before falling into the clutches of the devil.”). There was a distinction at the time between those who were 
born with some type of mental impairment (known as fools or idiots) and those who became mentally 
incompetent (or “insane”) later. See Wendy J. Turner, Mental Incapacity and the Financing of War in 
Medieval England, in THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR (PART II): DIFFERENT VISTAS 387, 388 (L.J. Andrew 
Villalon & Donald J. Kagay eds., 2008). 
 43 See Simon Kemp, Modern Myth and Medieval Madness: Views of Mental Illness in the European 
Middle Ages and Renaissance, 14 N.Z. J. PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (1985) (noting that Thomas Aquinas, writing in 
the thirteenth century, viewed possession as one form of insanity). Witchcraft was also believed to be the 
cause of some mental illness. See Richard Neugebauer, Mental Handicap in Medieval and Early Modern 
England: Criteria, Measurement and Care, in FROM IDIOCY TO MENTAL DEFICIENCY: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON PEOPLE WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 22, 22 (David Wright & Anne Digby eds., 1996) 
(citations omitted). Some historians have argued that the extent to which madness was attributed to sin 
and the supernatural in general in medieval times has been overstated. See Jerome Kroll & Bernard 
Bachrach, Sin and Mental Illness in the Middle Ages, 14 PSYCHOL. MED. 507, 507 (1984). 
 44 Kemp, supra note 43, at 5 (discussing medieval notions of mental illness and noting that the 
English legal records from the thirteenth century forward often identified the causes of insanity as 
physical). 
 45 See id. (discussing the humours theory of mental imbalance). 
 46 See Claire Trenery & Peregrine Horden, Madness in the Middle Ages, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
HISTORY OF MADNESS AND MENTAL HEALTH 62, 67 (Greg Eghigian ed., 2017). 
 47 See Kemp, supra note 43, at 6. 
 48 See MINOIS, supra note 28, at 191 (“[B]elief in the intervention of the devil had not completely 
disappeared from either the popular mind or religious attitudes.”). 
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this time.49 There still remained strong opposition to the practice, but the 
Enlightenment led to increased debate in philosophical and popular works 
concerning the morality of suicide.50 Importantly, it was during this era that 
suicide became identified more as a physiological concern than a moral or 
religious one.51 While some of the treatments for mental illness and suicidal 
tendencies seem odd by twenty-first-century standards, there was at least a 
general recognition that there were physiological causes for the conditions.52 
As suicide became less associated with sin and more with insanity, there 
were also increased calls to decriminalize suicide in the second half of the 
eighteenth century.53 
This increased focus on physiological explanations for mental illness 
also apparently led to an increased focus on the concept of insanity and its 
supposed connection to suicide. As the number of people committed to 
asylums and “madhouses” increased during the eighteenth century,54 the 
perception that insanity was closely connected to suicide grew. The fact that 
a dead person had a history of institutionalization or treatment for mental 
illness often led to a finding of suicide, “no matter how frail the other 
evidence was.”55 The connection between suicide and insanity solidified 
during this time to the point that “[a] majority of intellectuals . . . thought 
that madness was a component in most suicides.”56 By the end of the 
eighteenth century, the typical finding in suicide cases in England was that 
the decedent suffered from insanity at the time.57 
B. Societal Views on Suicide and Mental Illness in the United States 
Through the Present 
The Puritans initially brought with them to the New World the view that 
those who committed suicide had given in to Satan’s temptations.58 Thus, 
those who committed suicide were deemed sinners and denied a Christian 
 
 49 Id. It was also around this time that the word “suicide” began to be used. Id. at 181. 
 50 See id. at 241 (explaining the trend “toward the idea that suicide was a result of madness or 
physiological malfunction,” which “helped to relieve suicide of guilt”). 
 51 Id. 
 52 For example, one theory attributed mental illness to the influence of the moon on the atmosphere, 
which could cause derangement of the brain. Id. Possible treatments for melancholia included showers, 
chimney soot, and wood lice. Id. at 244. 
 53 Id. at 245; see also id. at 295–96 (discussing attitudes in France). 
 54 Id. at 245. According to one source, “people of the eighteenth century had the decided impression 
that the insane had increased in number.” Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 28. 
 58 Id. at 15, 21. 
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burial.59 But the American colonies were developing at a time when 
European attitudes were also evolving. So, while the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony originally refused to recognize insanity as a defense to a charge of 
suicide, the neighboring Providence Plantations declared that “a lunatic, mad 
or distracted man” could not be convicted.60 By the end of the seventeenth 
century, the Rhode Island view was more in keeping with the view in 
England and other colonies that mental illness provided an excuse for the 
otherwise wrongful nature of the act of suicide.61 
As the country grew during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
suicide became increasingly linked with insanity. An 1844 article appearing 
in The American Journal of Insanity advised that in most cases of suicide, 
“the individual was known to be melancholy, and partially insane.”62 The 
best course of care for individuals who were “reserved and melancholy” and 
had lost affection for family and business was “a residence in a well-directed 
Lunatic Asylum—for usually such persons need medical treatment.”63 
According to one source, by the 1840s, “expert opinion concerning the 
etiology of suicide became the province of that small group of physicians 
charged with administering asylums for the insane.”64 
Gradually, new theories as to the causes of suicide emerged.65 The 
medical field continued to debate the causes of suicide and the extent to 
which insanity was associated with suicide throughout the rest of the 
nineteenth century. The field of neurology eventually developed toward the 
end of the century, further influencing study of the issue.66 
As scientific views regarding the causes of suicide became more 
sophisticated, the American public’s views on the subject became more 
diverse. Suicide is still often linked with mental illness in the minds of many 
Americans,67 and mental illness remains a stigmatic condition in our 
 
 59 Id. at 21. 
 60 Id. at 22–23. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 35. 
 63 Id. at 35–36. 
 64 Id. at 37. 
 65 See id. at 42–51 (discussing theories). Émile Durkheim’s 1897 work Suicide was widely viewed 
as an important step in the understanding of suicide for its argument that suicide may be caused by 
multiple social factors and not simply physiological ones. See generally id. at 2–3 (discussing the 
importance of Durkheim’s work). 
 66 See generally KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 51–52 (discussing the medical field’s views regarding 
suicide during this time). 
 67 See Alan H. Marks, Historical Suicide, in 1 HANDBOOK OF DEATH & DYING 309, 316 (Clifton D. 
Bryant et al. eds., 2003) (citing results of a survey). 
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society.68 Some also continue to view suicide as immoral.69 But researchers 
have found that societal attitudes can vary dramatically depending upon 
one’s religious beliefs, geographic location, and other factors.70 Overall, 
however, it seems clear that Americans have become more tolerant of suicide 
in terms of its morality.71 For example, in 1950, only 36% of Americans 
believed that a doctor should be allowed to end a patient’s life by painless 
means if the patient has a disease that cannot be cured and the patient 
requests it.72 By 2016, that number had risen to almost 70%.73 Americans 
also increasingly view individuals as having a moral right to take their own 
lives in some circumstances. A 2013 Pew Research Center poll found that 
56% of respondents believed an individual has a moral right to take his or 
her own life where the individual has an incurable disease.74 Sixty-two 
percent of respondents believed such a moral right exists if an individual is 
suffering great pain and has no hope for improvement.75 These numbers 
reflect a 7% increase just from 1990.76 At the same time, there is evidence 
that Americans are less tolerant of suicide where the reason is that the 
decedent suffers from depression or chronic pain as opposed to an incurable 
disease.77 
C. The Law’s View of Suicide and Mental Illness 
1. Early Legal Views in the United States 
Judicial decisions involving suicide reflect a similar evolution in 
thinking in the United States. Surveying legal history, the Supreme Court 
observed in Washington v. Glucksberg that “for over 700 years, the Anglo-
American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of 
both suicide and assisting suicide.”78 For example, a sixteenth-century 
British decision declared suicide to be a felony because it is an offense 
 
 68 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 69 See Marks, supra note 67, at 316. 
 70 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Marks, supra note 67, at 316. 
 71 See Marks, supra note 67, at 316. 
 72 Art Swift, Euthanasia Still Acceptable to Solid Majority in U.S., GALLUP (June 24, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/193082/euthanasia-acceptable-solid-majority.aspx [https://perma.cc/5QVA-
EQQS] (reporting results of Gallup poll). 
 73 Id. 
 74 PEW RESEARCH CTR., Views on End-of-Life Medical Treatments, Chapter 2: Views on the 
Morality of Suicide (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/11/21/chapter-2-views-on-the-
morality-of-suicide [https://perma.cc/64JP-CYEA]. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Stillion & Stillion, supra note 15, at 83. 
 78 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997). 
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“against nature, against God, and against the King.”79 Blackstone famously 
described suicide as “[s]elf-[m]urder, the pretended heroism, but real 
cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers who destroyed themselves to avoid 
those ills which they had not the fortitude to endure.”80 Blackstone explained 
the felonious nature of suicide, in part, as an offense against the king (“who 
hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects”), and, in part, against 
God (in that suicide “invad[es] the prerogative of the Almighty, and rush[es] 
into his immediate presence uncalled for”).81 English common law even 
carved out a special punishment for those who took their own lives. If sane, 
the decedent’s act was a crime (felo de se) and his personal property was 
confiscated; if the decedent was determined to be insane (non compos 
mentis), there was no forfeiture.82 
This view of suicide as a felony originally carried over into Colonial 
American law. A majority of colonies retained the common law 
classification of suicide as a felony.83 Some colonies also carried over the 
forfeiture provisions of English common law.84 But, notably, colonies also 
increasingly recognized insanity as an excuse for suicide. Even in Puritan 
Massachusetts, coroners attempted to divine whether the decedent “knew the 
consequences of the act” and thus “voluntarily and feloniously, as a felon, of 
himself[] did kill and murder himself[].”85 By the end of the eighteenth 
century, most of the colonies had decriminalized suicide and rejected 
forfeiture provisions based on the harsh impact on the families of those who 
 
 79 Hales v. Petit (1562) 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (QB). 
 80 Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31–32 (Ct. App. 1960) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 189 (8th ed. 1778)). 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711–12 (summarizing the law); KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 18–19 
(discussing the role of insanity). During the sixteenth century in England, the vast majority of cases 
involving suicide resulted in a finding that the decedent was responsible for his actions. MINOIS, supra 
note 28, at 62. The fact that forfeiture was a lucrative source of income for the Crown and that the coroners 
in suicide cases received compensation for every verdict of suicide perhaps explain this outcome. See 
also id. (discussing relevant laws at the time and postulating “that an entire branch of the royal 
administration, from the local coroner to the king’s almoner, had an interest in a strict application of the 
laws on suicide”). 
 83 See Suzanne M. Alford, Note, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental Right?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1027 
(2003) (“The colonies of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, New Hampshire, New York, 
and Maryland all accepted the English common law’s treatment of suicide as a punishable crime.”). 
 84 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 712–13. 
 85 KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 25 (quoting Massachusetts law). Notably, “[s]uicide remained a crime 
in Massachusetts until the late nineteenth century.” Id. at 29. According to one source, juries often 
stretched to conclude that suicide was the result of insanity so as to avoid the harsh effects of forfeiture. 
See STEFAN, supra note 17, at 14. 
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committed suicide.86 But the moral and (to a lesser extent) legal disapproval 
of suicide continued into the nineteenth century.87 
As the nineteenth century progressed, suicide was less frequently 
deemed a crime.88 But the special legal issues raised by suicide persisted. 
Issues related to suicide most commonly came up in the context of insurance 
cases in which a family sought to collect on an insurance policy covering a 
decedent who had committed suicide.89 While the language in the contracts 
varied, they uniformly prohibited recovery where the insured committed 
suicide. The legal principle that typically emerged from these decisions (as 
well as British decisions around the same time90) was that the decedent’s 
suicide voided the right to collect insurance proceeds unless the decedent’s 
insanity prevented the decedent from understanding the consequences of his 
actions or the decedent was compelled by an insane impulse he could not 
resist.91 Drawing upon the criminal law, some courts explained that the act 
of taking one’s own life was not truly “suicide” if the decedent was insane.92 
If that were the case, recovery under an insurance policy could be permitted. 
This, in turn, led to a question as to the definition of insanity. Under the 
famed M’Naghten rule in the criminal context, to establish the defense of 
insanity, the criminal defendant had to establish that the defendant did not 
understand the nature or quality of the criminal act, or if he did, that he did 
not know the act was wrong.93 In the insurance policy cases, some courts 
took the position that if the decedent could not understand the moral 
implication of the act of taking his own life—if he could not distinguish 
between right and wrong—the decedent was insane and his act did not 
 
 86 See MINOIS, supra note 28, at 297; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 713 (“[T]he movement away 
from the common law’s harsh sanctions . . . reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to punish 
the suicide’s family for his wrongdoing.”); KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 30 (“[B]y the later eighteenth 
century, jurisdictions from Massachusetts to Virginia” had started to “accept the notion that suicide was 
an act whose commission was itself sufficient punishment”). Suicide was not formally decriminalized in 
England until 1961. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2 c. 60. 
 87 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 712–14 (discussing history); KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 26 (“Some 
Massachusetts Protestants continued to connect suicidal thoughts with diabolical temptation far into the 
eighteenth century . . . .”). 
 88 George P. Smith, II., All’s Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or 
Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 290 (1989). 
 89 Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. 580, 584–88 (1872); Dean v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 Mass. 
(4 Allen) 96, 107–08 (1862); Breasted v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 8 N.Y. 299, 308–09 (1853). 
 90 Clift v. Schwabe (1846) 136 Eng. Rep. 175, 175 (CP) (cited in Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. 
Co., 67 N.E. 424, 425 (Mass. 1903)); Borradaile v. Hunter (1843) 134 Eng. Rep. 715, 715 (CP) (cited in 
Daniels, 67 N.E. at 425). 
 91 See Terry, 82 U.S. at 584–87 (summarizing decisions). 
 92 Phadenhauer v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 54 Tenn. 567, 577 (1872). 
 93 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (HL). 
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amount to suicide in the legal sense.94 Other courts took the position that the 
ability of the decedent to understand the wrongness of the act of his taking 
his own life was irrelevant; what mattered was whether the decedent 
understood the nature and consequences of his act.95 If not, the decedent was 
insane, the act was not suicide, and recovery could be had under the 
insurance policy. 
Regardless of the exact approach, American courts were essentially 
applying the English common law principles regarding forfeiture and 
insanity.96 If “insane”—however that term was defined—the decedent was 
not blameworthy and his family’s right to recover under the insurance policy 
should not be forfeited. If the decedent was not insane, forfeiture was 
appropriate.97 
Issues of morality frequently appeared in these decisions, with courts 
sometimes referring to suicide as “sinful and immoral,”98 as well as noting 
that suicide was wrong from “a religious and moral point of view.”99 In an 
1898 decision, the Supreme Court explained that an insured’s act of taking 
his life should not be interpreted as being part of the parties’ contemplation 
at the time the agreement was entered into, because a contract “which is 
subversive of sound morality, ought never to receive the sanction of a court 
of justice.”100 These decisions also tended to reflect then-current societal 
 
 94 Phadenhauer, 54 Tenn. at 577–78. 
 95 See id. at 575 (summarizing the position of English courts on the issue). 
 96 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 97 The issue of how one party’s alleged insanity should influence resolution of legal issues impacting 
that party has, of course, been an issue outside the narrow confines of tort and insurance law. See, e.g., 
Joshua C. Tate, Personal Reality: Delusion in Law and Science, 49 CONN. L. REV. 891, 891 (2017) 
(discussing the concept of a delusion in making legal determinations regarding mental capacity in the 
context of wills). 
 98 Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 424–25 (1877); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Milward, 
118 Ky. 716, 722 (1904) (“The act of suicide is not only unnatural, but is highly immoral and criminal.”); 
Benard v. Protected Home Circle, 146 N.Y.S. 232, 235 (App. Div. 1914) (referring to suicide as illegal 
and immoral). 
 99 Phadenhauer, 54 Tenn. at 570–71 (quoting jury instruction); see Breasted v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. 
Co., 8 N.Y. 299, 302 (1853) (“The facts establish that the assured well knew that by throwing himself 
into the river he would be drowned, and that he intended to drown himself and knew it was morally wrong 
to do so.”); see also Dean v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 96, 101 (1862) (“He may have acted 
from an insane impulse, which prevented him from appreciating the moral consequences of suicide.”). 
 100 See Ritter v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 169 U.S. 139, 154, 160 (1898) (holding that decedent’s 
death, “if directly and intentionally caused by himself, when in sound mind, was not a risk intended to be 
covered, or which could legally have been covered”). 
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attitudes regarding mental illness, using such terms as “lunatic,”101 
“madman,”102 “madly insane,”103 and “raving madness.”104 
2. Modern Legal Views on Suicide 
As societal views regarding suicide evolved, so too did the law’s 
approach to cases involving suicide. While some twentieth-century opinions 
continued to express moral disapproval of suicide,105 explicit references to 
suicide being an immoral act began to appear less frequently in judicial 
decisions. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Cruzan v. Missouri Department 
of Health106 and Washington v. Glucksberg,107 both of which involved end-
of-life issues, could hardly avoid the moral issues present. But the decisions 
lacked the sort of moral admonishment of earlier decisions and recognized 
that the decision to end one’s life could be rational.108 Today, courts dealing 
with cases involving a decedent’s decision to take her own life are now more 
likely to acknowledge the difficult moral issues involved and to refrain from 
the sort of condemnation present in earlier decisions.109 
 
 101 Breasted, 8 N.Y. at 301. 
 102 Id. at 305. 
 103 Id. at 301. 
 104 Dean, 86 Mass. at 100. An 1872 U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning the insurance policy 
issue referenced a book entitled A Practical Treatise on the Law Concerning Lunatics, Idiots, and Persons 
of Unsound Mind from 1833. See Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. 580, 588 n.26 (1872) (citing JOHN 
ARMSTRONG, THE ART OF PRESERVING HEALTH 131 (1796), and LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND, at xlvi 
(1833)). 
 105 See, e.g., Blackwood v. Jones, 149 So. 600, 601 (Fla. 1933) (“No sophistry is tolerated in 
consideration of legal problems which seek to justify self-destruction as commendable or even a matter 
of personal right, and therefore such an argument is unsound which seeks to prove that an accusation 
unfounded in fact that a person sought to destroy his or her own life is not reprehensible but a normal 
thought reflecting in no wise upon the wickedness of the person accused of suicide.”). 
 106 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 107 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 108 See id. at 747–48 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that an adequately informed patient might 
make a rational choice for assisted suicide). 
 109 One of the more noteworthy decisions in this regard is Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 
2009), a case involving the constitutionality of state homicide statutes in the case of physician-assisted 
suicide. There, the majority opinion spoke at length about the language surrounding the issue and the 
majority’s decisions with respect to the language it used. The majority noted its decision not to use the 
term “suicide” given the fact the term “suggests an act of self-destruction that historically has been 
condemned as sinful, immoral, or damning by many religions.” Id. at 1226. 
“Suicide” is a pejorative term in our society. Unfortunately, it is also a term used liberally by the 
State and its amici (as well as the Dissent) in this case. The term denigrates the complex individual 
circumstances that drive persons generally—and, in particular, those who are incurably ill and face 
prolonged illness and agonizing death—to take their own lives. The term is used to generate 
antipathy, and it does. The Patients and the class of people they represent do not seek to commit 
“suicide.” Rather, they acknowledge that death within a relatively short time is inescapable because 
of their illness or disease. And with that fact in mind, they seek the ability to self-administer, at a 
time and place of their choosing, a physician-prescribed medication that will assist them in 
preserving their own human dignity during the inevitable process of dying. Having come to grips 
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Despite the changes in societal and legal views regarding suicide, the 
fact that suicide is involved in a case still complicates the legal analysis. 
There are still occasional references to the traditional societal disapproval 
and moral issues surrounding suicide.110 Mental illness, which is often an 
underlying cause of suicide, remains a problematic and sometimes stigmatic 
condition.111 Finally, suicide raises difficult questions of causation and 
foreseeability for courts. 
II. TORT LAW’S TREATMENT OF SUICIDE CASES 
Tort law’s historical treatment of cases involving suicide represents a 
combination of society’s traditionally negative views regarding suicide and 
tort law’s traditional concerns with foreseeability and expanding liability in 
cases involving emotional injury. Courts developed special rules dealing 
with suicide that worked to limit the scope of liability for a defendant whose 
actions allegedly resulted in a decedent’s suicide. These special rules, which 
were developed at an earlier time with an earlier understanding of the causes 
of suicide, continue to influence the law of negligence and intentional torts. 
A. Negligence Cases 
Tort liability for negligence that contributes to a decedent’s suicide is 
difficult to establish. In cases in which a defendant engaged in affirmative 
conduct that contributed to the decedent’s suicide, plaintiffs often face 
significant problems establishing the proximate cause element of a 
negligence claim. While not as severe, plaintiffs face similar problems in 
cases in which a defendant is alleged to have negligently failed to prevent a 
suicide. 
 
with the inexorability of their death, they simply ask the government not to force them to suffer and 
die in an agonizing, degrading, humiliating, and undignified manner. They seek nothing more nor 
less; that is all this case is about. 
Id.  
 110 See Haines v. Davies, Nos. 1:07–cv–00851, 1:07–cv–00852, 2009 WL 331433, at *2 (M.D. Pa. 
Feb. 9, 2009) (considering motion to exclude evidence relating to suicide because “suicide is viewed by 
some as a sinful, immoral, violent act, and therefore may be prejudicial”); Seals, Inc. v. Tioga Cty. Grange 
Mut. Ins. Co., 519 A.2d 951, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“To commit suicide is in the minds of many a 
reprehensible, even immoral and sinful act.”); infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text (discussing 
still-existing special rules regarding suicide). 
 111 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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1. Causation Issues in Cases Involving Affirmative Conduct 
Resulting in Suicide 
In order to establish liability, a negligence plaintiff must establish that 
the defendant’s breach of duty was a proximate cause of her injuries.112 While 
proximate cause is a concept that is largely incapable of precise definition, 
the main focus is upon foreseeability.113 If the injuries that resulted from the 
defendant’s negligence were within the scope of foreseeable risk caused by 
the defendant’s behavior, proximate cause exists.114 In situations in which a 
defendant’s negligent actions have helped contribute to a decedent’s suicide, 
courts have developed several special rules regarding proximate cause in 
cases involving suicide that operate to limit liability. 
a. The standard suicide rule 
One of the earliest statements of the law regarding suicide and 
proximate cause appears in the 1881 Supreme Court case of Scheffer v. 
Railroad Co.115 Scheffer killed himself after suffering physical and mental 
injuries as a result of a train collision.116 His executors brought a wrongful 
death action, alleging that the negligence of the train company caused 
Scheffer’s suicide.117 The Court sustained the defendant’s demurrer, holding 
that the proximate cause of Scheffer’s death “was his own act of self-
destruction.”118 Suicide “was not the natural and probable consequence” of 
the defendant’s negligence and, therefore, “could not have been foreseen,” 
according to the Court.119 Subsequent courts followed this same logic, 
concluding that suicide is “so highly extraordinary or unexpected” that it 
falls outside “the realm of reasonable foreseeability as a matter of law.”120 
This idea that suicide is an unforeseeable consequence of a defendant’s 
negligence, and therefore the efficient or superseding cause of death, is now 
widely accepted among U.S. courts.121 Indeed, the rule is actually known as 
 
 112 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 
1984). 
 113 See id. at 263 (“There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more 
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.”); id. at 280 (discussing the 
role of foreseeability). 
 114 See id. at 281 (discussing the concept of scope of risk). 
 115 105 U.S. 249 (1881). 
 116 Id. at 250. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 252. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala. 1993) (quoting 57A AM. JUR. 2D 
Negligence § 652 (1989)). 
 121 See Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 755 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the general 
rule is that “suicide is said to be a supervening cause of the victim’s loss of his life, breaking the chain of 
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“the suicide rule” in at least one jurisdiction.122 Some formulation of this rule 
has been adopted in nearly every jurisdiction.123 This rule has been applied 
 
responsibility that would otherwise link the loss to the negligent act”); Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 
39 (Ct. App. 1960) (stating that “the practically unanimous rule is that [suicide] is a new and independent 
agency which does not come within and complete a line of causation from the wrongful act to the death 
and therefore does not render defendant liable for the suicide”); see also Brouhard ex rel. Estate of 
Brouhard v. Village of Oxford, 990 F. Supp. 839, 842 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (“Generally, a decedent’s suicide 
is considered an unforeseeable intervening act between the defendants’ conduct and the decedent’s 
death.”); Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (Mont. 1989) (“The general rule . . . is that [n]egligence 
actions for the suicide of another will generally not lie since the act or suicide is considered a deliberate 
intervening act exonerating the defendant from legal responsibility . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 122 Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 440 (7th Cir. 2009) (referring to the “Illinois 
‘suicide rule’”). 
 123 See Gilmore, 613 So. 2d at 1275; Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 183 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1966); Tate, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 40; Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 436 (Colo. App. 2007); 
Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Conn. 1997); Porter v. Murphy, 792 A.2d 1009, 1015 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 2001); District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1275 (D.C. 1987); Appling v. Jones, 
154 S.E.2d 406, 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 330 (Haw. 1996); Little v. 
Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 203 N.E.2d 902, 904 (Ill. 1965); Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 
642 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Ind. 1994); Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Iowa 2000); Epelbaum v. Elf 
Atochem, North America, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 429, 431 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (applying Kentucky law); 
Bertrand v. Air Logistics, Inc., 820 So. 2d 1228, 1231, 1232 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Sindler v. Litman, 
887 A.2d 97, 109–10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005); Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424, 
426 (Mass. 1903); Costigan v. Plets, No. 298286, 2011 WL 6376016, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 
2011); Truddle v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-DeSoto, Inc., 150 So. 3d 692, 697 (Miss. 2014); Krieg, 781 P.2d 
at 279; Long v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry. Co., 187 N.W. 930, 932, 933 (Neb. 1922); McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 
461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983); Brenner v. Pub. Serv. Prod. Co., 164 A. 454, 455 (N.J. 1933); Rimbert 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1199 (D.N.M. 2008) (applying New Mexico law); Cauverien v. 
De Metz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Fischer v. Morales, 526 N.E.2d 1098, 1101 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1987); Runyon v. Reid, 510 P.2d 943, 949 (Okla. 1973); Ferris v. Cleaveland, No. 3:10-1302, 
2012 WL 2564782, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2012) (applying Pennsylvania law); Scott v. Greenville 
Pharmacy, Inc., 48 S.E.2d 324, 328 (S.C. 1948); Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 593 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2003); Exxon Corp. v. Breecheen, 526 S.W.2d 519, 523–24 (Tex. 1975); Lenoci v. Leonard, 
21 A.3d 694, 699–700 (Vt. 2011); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 292 P. 436, 444 (Wash. 1930); R.D. v. 
W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 28 (Wyo. 1994). Nevada, Oregon, and Utah appear to be the only states not to address 
the issue, although Nevada has at least considered the general issue in the context of a workers’ 
compensation claim. See Doe v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:15-cv-00793-APG-GWF, 2017 WL 
1483428, at *8 (D. Nev. Apr. 21, 2017) (“Nevada has not yet addressed whether suicide is an intervening 
act that breaks the chain of causation between a defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries.”); 
Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 188 P.3d 1084, 1090 (Nev. 2008) (discussing causation in the context of 
workers’ compensation). Virginia’s treatment of such cases is discussed infra notes 133–36 and 
accompanying text. West Virginia has recognized claims based on the failure to prevent suicide, see 
Moats v. Preston Cty. Comm’n, 521 S.E.2d 180, 189 (W. Va. 1999), but has not expressly ruled on 
whether the traditional suicide rule bars recovery where a defendant is alleged to have caused the suicide, 
see Setser v. Harvey, No. 14-0680, 2015 WL 1741136, at *3 (W. Va. Apr. 10, 2015). At least one state, 
Texas, has adopted a statute providing an affirmative defense in the case of suicide that roughly tracks 
the standard suicide rule: 
(a) It is an affirmative defense to a civil action for damages for personal injury or death that the 
plaintiff, at the time the cause of action arose, was: 
. . . 
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in a variety of factual settings, from disseminating allegedly dangerous 
fantasy games to children124 to negligently misdiagnosing potentially fatal 
diseases.125 
Issues of proximate cause are typically issues of fact for the jury to 
resolve.126 But in wrongful death cases involving suicide, courts frequently 
apply the suicide rule and conclude as a matter of law that proximate 
causation is lacking.127 Sometimes the rule is applied in rote fashion without 
further elaboration.128 In other instances, courts explain that suicide is such 
an abnormal act that it breaks the chain of causation and amounts to a 
superseding cause.129 Occasionally, plaintiffs are able to survive a motion to 
dismiss or summary judgment on these claims, but in the typical case, a 
decedent’s suicide serves to break the chain of causation and bar recovery.130 
Judge Richard Posner has explained the underlying justification for the 
general rule: 
A person is not liable for such improbable consequences of negligent activity 
as could hardly figure in his deciding how careful he should be. Liability in such 
 
(2) committing or attempting to commit suicide, and the plaintiff’s conduct in committing or 
attempting to commit suicide was the sole cause of the damages sustained; provided, however, if 
the suicide or attempted suicide was caused in whole or in part by a failure on the part of any 
defendant to comply with an applicable legal standard, then such suicide or attempted suicide shall 
not be a defense. 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 93.001 (West 2018). 
 124 Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 384 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 125 Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 126 Wood v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 419 P.3d 503, 506 (Wyo. 2018). 
 127 See, e.g., Long, 187 N.W. at 932, 934. 
 128 Cf. Lenoci, 21 A.3d at 699–700 (choosing to elaborate before applying the rule). 
 129 The idea that suicide is an “abnormal thing” or usually the result of an abnormal mental condition 
appears frequently in the decisions. See, e.g., Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (E.D. 
Mich. 1981) (“With few exceptions, one who commits suicide is suffering some abnormal mental 
condition.”). Many of the references to suicide being an “abnormal thing” come from a passage in Prosser 
& Keeton on Torts, which courts often quote: 
Some difficulty has arisen in cases where the injured person becomes insane and commits suicide. 
Although there are cases to the contrary, it seems the better view that when his insanity prevents 
him from realizing the nature of his act or controlling his conduct, his suicide is to be regarded 
either as a direct result and no intervening force at all, or as a normal incident of the risk, for which 
the defendant will be liable. The situation is the same as if he should hurt himself during 
unconsciousness or delirium brought on by the injury. But if the suicide is during a lucid interval, 
when he is in full command of his faculties but his life has become unendurable to him, it is agreed 
that his voluntary choice is an abnormal thing, which supersedes the defendant’s liability. 
Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 221–22 (Tenn. 1965) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 273–74 (2d ed. 1955)); see also Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 
414 P.2d 179, 185 (Ariz. 1966) (same); Estate of Girard v. Town of Putnam, No. CV085002754–S, 
2011 WL 783599, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2011) (same). 
 130 Compare MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying 
Tennessee law and affirming summary judgment in defendant’s favor in case involving harassing debt 
collection), with Burdett v. Harrah’s Kansas Casino Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1234, 1237 (D. Kan. 
2003) (overruling motion to dismiss in case involving harassing debt collection results). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
786 
circumstances would serve no deterrent, no regulatory purpose; it would not 
alter behavior and increase safety. Nothing would be gained by imposing 
liability in such a case but compensation, and compensation can be obtained 
more cheaply by insurance.131 
But other considerations have also clearly influenced courts. 
Longstanding concerns over the morality of suicide still linger to some extent 
in more modern decisions.132 For example, suicide remains a common law 
crime in Virginia.133 And in Virginia (as in several other states), “a party who 
consents to and participates in an immoral or illegal act cannot recover 
damages from other participants for the consequence of that act.”134 
Negligence defendants have had some success in asserting that suicide is an 
immoral or unlawful act and thus bars recovery.135 
An element of blameworthiness or culpability also arguably underlies 
the general rule that suicide constitutes a superseding or efficient cause.136 
Typically, the concept of a superseding or efficient cause refers to the actions 
of a third party or some outside force, rather than the conduct of the 
plaintiff.137 But some courts have explained that the plaintiff’s conduct may 
qualify as a superseding or efficient cause where it is highly extraordinary 
and where the conduct “is more than mere contributory negligence and is of 
a higher culpability level than the defendant’s negligence.”138 At least one 
 
 131 Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 132 See Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F. Supp. 998, 1001–02 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (attributing some of the 
special treatment of suicide cases to the association of suicide with criminality); Delaney v. Reynolds, 
825 N.E.2d 554, 557 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that cases from other jurisdictions cite to “the 
historic notion that suicide is an immoral or culpable act” as a policy underlying the general rule); see 
also Clift v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 808 (R.I. 1996) (noting that suicide remains a 
common law felony in Rhode Island). 
 133 Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Va. 1992). 
 134 Id. (quoting Miller v. Bennett, 56 S.E.2d 217, 218 (Va. 1949)); see also Tug Valley Pharmacy, 
LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo, 773 S.E.2d 627, 638–39 (W. Va. 2015) (Loughry, J., dissenting) 
(noting that this rule has been adopted in thirteen jurisdictions). 
 135 See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying this rule and affirming judgment 
as a matter of law in favor of defendant); Hill v. Nicodemus, 755 F. Supp. 692, 694 (W.D. Va. 1991) 
(applying this rule and granting summary judgment for defendant). See generally Moats v. Preston Cty. 
Comm’n, 521 S.E.2d 180, 188, 189 (W. Va. 1999) (declining to adopt this prohibition). 
 136 See Allen C. Schlinsog, Jr., Comment, The Suicidal Decedent: Culpable Wrongdoer, or 
Wrongfully Deceased?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 463, 471 (1991) (attributing the special causation rules 
regarding suicide to the “public policy concern that the suicidal decedent was culpable”). 
 137 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. at 
571 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (discussing the superseding cause concept and noting “employing superseding 
cause to bar a plaintiff’s recovery based on the plaintiff’s conduct is difficult to reconcile with modern 
notions of comparative responsibility”). 
 138 Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala. 1993) (quoting 57A AM. JUR. 2D 
Negligence § 652 (1989)); see also Mesick v. State, 504 N.Y.S.2d 279, 282 (App. Div. 1986) (stating 
rule). 
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court has pointed to this principle in concluding that suicide qualifies as such 
a cause.139 
b. The “delirium or insanity” (or “rage or frenzy”) exception 
The most common exception to the rule that a decedent’s suicide 
amounts to a superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation is where 
the defendant’s negligence brings about “delirium or insanity” that causes 
the victim to commit suicide.140 The exception appeared in the first 
Restatement of Torts in 1934 and was carried over in Section 455 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The exception provides for liability where a 
defendant’s negligence results in the plaintiff’s “delirium or insanity,” which 
(a) prevents him from realizing the nature of his act and the certainty or risk of 
harm involved therein, or 
(b) makes it impossible for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity which 
deprives him of his capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason.141 
The comments explain that the first clause only applies when the 
plaintiff’s delirium or insanity (also frequently referred to in the decisional 
law as “rage” or “frenzy”142) “is so extreme as to prevent him from 
understanding what he is doing” or from understanding the consequences of 
his actions.143 In support of the rule, the second Restatement authors cited 
several cases in which a defendant’s negligence caused physical harm to the 
decedent, which also severely impacted the decedent’s mental capacity.144 
The ultimate question in most of these cases was whether the defendant’s 
negligence caused the decedent to be unable to understand the physical 
nature and consequences of his act.145 As originally envisioned by the 
authors, this first clause was an extremely limited exception to the general 
 
 139 Gilmore, 613 So. 2d at 1275. 
 140 See, e.g., Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 810 (R.I. 1996) (applying this 
exception); Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing this 
exception). 
 141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 142 Prill v. Marrone, 23 So. 3d 1, 8 (Ala. 2009); City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 800 S.E.2d 573, 578 
(Ga. 2017); Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702, 706–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Nguyen v. 
Mass. Inst. of Tech., 96 N.E.3d 128, 139 n.12 (Mass. 2018); Maloney v. Badman, 938 A.2d 883, 887 
(N.H. 2007); Bogust v. Iverson, 102 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Wis. 1960). The same phraseology is also used in 
the workers’ compensation setting in determining whether a suicide qualifies as a compensable injury. 
See Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 188 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Nev. 2008). 
 143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 cmt. b. 
 144 Id. § 455 reporter’s notes; Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424 (Mass. 1903); 
Millman v. U.S. Mortg. & Title Guar. Co., 1 A.2d 265 (N.J. 1938); Koch v. Fox, 75 N.Y.S. 913 (App. 
Div. 1902); Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 67 S.E.2d 63 (N.C. 1951); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 292 P. 
436 (Wash. 1930). 
 145 See, e.g., Long v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 187 N.W. 930, 934 (Neb. 1922). 
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rule that suicide breaks the chain of causation for purposes of a wrongful 
death claim. Liability could be imposed only where the defendant’s 
negligence caused physical harm so extensive that it actually impacted the 
decedent’s mental functioning to the point that the decedent could not 
understand that his actions were likely to lead to his own death.146 The 
decisions also make clear that in crafting this rule, courts were borrowing 
from the older insurance policy cases.147 There appear to be few modern 
cases applying this part of the exception. 
The second clause in Section 455 applies when the defendant’s 
negligent conduct results in a plaintiff’s delirium or insanity, which produces 
an irresistible impulse to do an act.148 The plaintiff may recover even if the 
plaintiff understands the nature or likely consequences of the act, provided 
“his act is done under an insane impulse which is irresistible because his 
insanity has prevented his reason from controlling his actions.”149 None of 
the cases cited by the authors of the second Restatement shed much light as 
to the concept of irresistible suicidal impulses, perhaps because none of the 
cases cited actually resulted in a finding of such an impulse.150 Nonetheless, 
the idea that an insane impulse excused the fact of suicide had been floating 
around in American legal decisions for quite some time before the adoption 
of the first Restatement.151 
The limited nature of the exception to the standard rule regarding 
suicide and proximate cause is emphasized in a comment to Section 455. The 
fact that a defendant’s negligence causes harm to an individual that results 
in depression (or “extreme melancholia”) does not make the defendant liable 
 
 146 See Eckerd’s, Inc. v. McGhee, 86 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935) (stating there could be 
no recovery “unless [the decedent’s] reason and memory were, at the time, so far obscured that she did 
not know and understand what she was doing”). The limited nature of the exception is best illustrated by 
the two non-suicide cases cited by the authors. In one, the defendant’s negligence caused the decedent to 
suffer a concussion, which resulted in her becoming dizzy and falling out of a window. Millman, 1 A.2d 
at 269. In the other, the decedent’s car struck the defendant’s car. Hall, 67 S.E.2d at 64–65. The decedent, 
“in a dazed and addled condition,” got out of the car, walked out onto the highway, and was struck by 
another oncoming car. Id. Thus, both cases involved decedents in a state of delirium that ultimately 
resulted in another injury. Both decisions focused almost exclusively on the issue of proximate cause, 
specifically whether the defendant’s negligence resulted in a continuous sequence of events unbroken by 
any unforeseeable cause. Millman, 1 A.2d at 269–70; Hall, 67 S.E.2d at 67. Both courts did include brief 
mentions of the delirium or insanity rule as described in the first Restatement of Torts, but the references 
were included largely to bolster the court’s conclusion regarding proximate cause. Millman, 1 A.2d at 
270; Hall, 67 S.E.2d at 67. 
 147 See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text; Koch, 75 N.Y.S. at 921. 
 148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 cmt. c. 
 149 Id. 
 150 In re Sponatski, 108 N.E. 466 (Mass. 1915); Delinousha v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 161 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 
1928); Garrigan v. Kennedy, 101 N.W. 1081 (N.D. 1904). 
 151 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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for the decedent’s suicide.152 This is true even where the decedent takes his 
own life “because of his dread of the increasingly frequent recurrence of 
these attacks.”153 Unless the defendant’s negligence causes injury that results 
in insanity or delirium in a form that prevents an individual from 
understanding the nature of his act or that creates an irresistible suicidal 
impulse, suicide breaks the chain of causation.154 
Despite the fact that this exception has been part of tort law for over a 
century, courts are not at all consistent in their application of the exception.155 
Courts generally treat as synonymous the concepts of “mental illness,” 
“mental derangement,” and “delirium or insanity.”156 Some courts require 
documentation of a mental illness, as opposed to a mere mental condition 
(whatever difference there may be between those terms), before the 
exception is triggered,157 whereas others do not delineate between the two 
concepts158 or otherwise speak primarily in terms of the existence of a 
 
 152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 cmt. d. 
 153 Id. 
 154 The case that most clearly seems to have most directly influenced the authors of the Restatement 
was Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424 (Mass. 1903). There, the decedent was injured 
at a railroad crossing and killed himself nearly two months later. Id. at 425. According to medical experts, 
the decedent “was probably insane when he took his life.” Id. The court expressly framed the issue 
regarding the right to recover in terms of proximate cause. Recognizing that the decedent was probably 
insane at the time and that his insanity might very well have been caused by the collision, the court held 
that the suicide was “an independent, direct, and proximate cause of the death.” Id. at 426. Drawing upon 
other decisions, the court concluded that “the liability of a defendant for a death by suicide exists only 
when the death is the result of an uncontrollable impulse, or is accomplished . . . without conscious 
volition to produce death, having knowledge of the physical nature and consequences of the act.” Id. This 
is essentially the same test that appears in Section 455. 
 155 See Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) 
(noting problems with the rule as “demonstrated by the various ways” in which courts have applied it). 
 156 See Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (Mass. 1978) (permitting recovery where 
plaintiff’s “mental illness” or “mental derangement” resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to kill herself). 
 157 See Estate of Ko ex rel. Hill v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 982 F. Supp. 471, 476 (E.D. Mich. 1997), 
aff’d 173 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 1999) (granting summary judgment where decedent’s expert witness failed 
to testify that decedent suffered from a mental illness); Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 
1292 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (distinguishing between mental conditions and mental illnesses and saying “it is 
essential that a full explanation of the claimed mental illness be offered to assist the trier of fact in 
resolution of the question of causation”); Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 438 (Colo. App. 2007) 
(drawing a distinction between the terms and concluding that “mental illness” is the more useful term); 
Worsham v. Nix, 83 P.3d 879, 887 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003) (affirming summary judgment for defendant 
in the absence of any documentation of mental illness or delirium). 
 158 See Grant v. F.P. Lathrop Constr. Co., 146 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 (Ct. App. 1978) (“No fair distinction 
may be made between a mental condition, and mental illness or insanity, proximately caused by another’s 
tortious conduct which results in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide.”); District of Columbia v. 
Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1276 (D.C. 1987) (“‘[M]ental illness,’ ‘mental condition,’ and ‘insanity’ are 
generally considered synonymous terms, and should be so construed.”). 
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“mental condition.”159 Still others gloss over the initial requirement that the 
decedent have been insane or under a delirium and proceed directly to the 
question of whether the decedent acted pursuant to an uncontrollable impulse 
or otherwise treat an uncontrollable impulse as a form of insanity itself.160 
In practice, the delirium or insanity exception is of limited value for 
plaintiffs.161 The most obvious limitation of the rule for plaintiffs is that there 
must actually be some evidence that the decedent was experiencing 
“delirium or insanity” that impacted the decedent’s decision-making 
process.162 As a practical matter, this will normally require expert 
testimony.163 In addition, the fact that an individual was “insane” is not 
enough, by itself, to satisfy this exception. The plaintiff must show that the 
mental illness actually resulted in an irresistible impulse to commit suicide 
as opposed to a mere suicidal tendency.164 For example, in one case, the 
decedent’s psychiatrist testified that the decedent suffered from depression 
that was a “powerful contributor” to his suicide and that “it had been his 
experience that people who kill themselves feel an overwhelming sense of 
hopelessness and helplessness so that they cannot think about various options 
but can see only one sort of release or relief.”165 According to the court, this 
 
 159 See McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983); Orcutt v. Spokane, 364 P.2d 1102, 
1105 (Wash. 1961) (en banc); see also James A. Howell, Comment, Civil Liability for Suicide: An 
Analysis of the Causation Issue, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 573, 575 (noting that some courts permit recovery 
where a “mental condition” as opposed to insanity exists). 
 160 See Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that an 
irresistible impulse is a form of mental insanity); Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 434, 
445 (D.S.C. 2016) (rejecting any requirement that the impulse be caused by insanity and instead focusing 
on the existence of the impulse itself). 
 161 See Note, Tortious Inducement of Suicide: A Study of the Judicial Ostrich, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 
166, 166–67 (stating that court decisions applying the exception “render recovery virtually impossible in 
circumstances short of complete loss of bodily control”); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Civil Liability for 
Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry, 24 VAND. L. REV. 217, 227–28 (1971) (noting that 
the “stringent requirements” of the test limit its reach). 
 162 An example of where the resort to the exception proved successful is Young v. Swiney, 23 F. 
Supp. 3d 596, 615 (D. Md. 2014). There, the plaintiff’s expert was willing to testify that the decedent’s 
suicide “was directly and proximately caused by the psychosis he sustained as a result” of the defendant’s 
negligence. Id. at 617. The expert helpfully explained that “[t]he layman’s term for psychosis would be 
‘insanity’” and that the decedent’s suicide was “due to an irresistible impulse when he was not in his right 
mind.” Id. at 618. 
 163 See Sindler v. Litman, 887 A.2d 97, 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (explaining that the issue 
requires expert testimony); Orcutt v. Spokane, 364 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Wash. 1961) (en banc) (concluding 
a jury question exists “where there is medical testimony that the injury sustained by the decedent caused 
a mental condition which resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide”). 
 164 See Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. App. 2007); see also Baxter v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 585, 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that expert’s testimony that depression 
caused the plaintiff’s suicide was insufficient to create a jury question as to whether plaintiff was unable 
to resist the impulse to take her life). 
 165 District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1277 (D.C. 1987). 
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was insufficient to create a question for the jury on the proximate cause issue 
because it did not establish that the defendant’s action caused a condition 
that “resulted in the decedent’s having an irresistible or uncontrollable 
impulse to commit suicide.”166 
Some plaintiffs are unable to establish that the decedent had an 
irresistible impulse to commit suicide due to the fact that the act appears to 
have been premeditated. Typically, the more evidence there is that the 
decision to commit suicide was thought out in advance, the less likely it is 
the exception will apply.167 For example, Lenoci v. Leonard168 involved a 
teenage girl who committed suicide after a traumatic incident. She had 
threatened suicide several times before the traumatic incident, going so far 
on one occasion as describing her plan to do so.169 On the night after the 
incident, she texted several of her friends about the incident, texted her 
boyfriend goodbye, composed a suicide note, and then carried out the suicide 
plan she had previously described.170 While it seems clear that the traumatic 
incident the girl experienced was the triggering event for her suicide, 
according to the Vermont Supreme Court, the events leading to her death 
were “not evidence of an ‘uncontrollable impulse,’ but rather of a voluntary, 
deliberate, and tragic choice by a girl who knew the purpose and the physical 
effect of her actions.”171 Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant.172 
The final factor limiting the value of the delirium or insanity exception 
for plaintiffs is that courts often decide the issue as a matter of law.173 As is 
the case with the issue of proximate cause more generally in suicide cases, 
questions as to whether a decedent was experiencing delirium or insanity, 
could comprehend the consequences of her actions, or was acting under an 
irresistible impulse would generally seem to be questions of fact for the 
jury.174 But given the specific evidentiary requirements necessary to invoke 
 
 166 Id. at 1276. 
 167 See Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) 
(citing counterexamples, but stating “the majority of courts have found that if the evidence shows the 
decedent planned the suicide and knew what he was doing, no irresistible impulse existed even where it 
is clear that the decedent committed suicide as a result of injuries”). But see Fuller v. Preis, 322 N.E.2d 
263, 268 (N.Y. 1974) (“An irresistible impulse does not necessarily mean a ‘sudden’ impulse.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 168 21 A.3d 694 (Vt. 2011). 
 169 Id. at 697. 
 170 Id. at 700. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 701. 
 173 See, e.g., supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 174 See Estate of Van Dyke ex rel. Van Dyke v. Glaxo Smithkline, No. 05–CV–153–J, 2009 WL 
10669421, at *5 (D. Wyo. Apr. 14, 2009) (stating that the issue of whether an individual was acting 
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the exception,175 courts frequently decide these issues as a matter of law 
against plaintiffs.176 
2. Causation Issues in Cases Involving the Failure to 
Prevent Suicide 
The other common fact pattern involving civil liability stemming from 
suicide is where the defendant fails to exercise reasonable care in preventing 
the decedent from committing suicide. Unlike the situation where the 
defendant’s negligence allegedly causes the decedent to commit suicide, 
these are cases in which the defendant did not act to prevent the suicide from 
occurring. A clear example would be the situation where prison officials fail 
to take reasonable steps to prevent a prisoner from committing suicide while 
in custody.177 
The standard suicide rule does not have the same limiting effect in this 
context as it does in other cases. Indeed, some courts refer to this situation 
as an exception to the traditional suicide rule that treats suicide as a 
superseding cause; where the defendant owes an affirmative duty to take 
reasonable steps to prevent suicide, suicide is not a superseding cause.178 
However, the fact that suicide is involved still tends to limit liability. 
Typically, courts do not recognize a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
protect another from harm; however, there are several types of special 
relationships that can give rise to such a duty, as listed in Section 314A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.179 One noteworthy feature of the suicide 
cases is that the number of relationships that courts are willing to recognize 
as “special” enough to impose a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent 
another’s suicide is markedly lower than in other factual scenarios.180 So, for 
 
pursuant to an uncontrollable impulse should ordinarily be a jury question), rev’d on other grounds, 
388 F. App’x 786 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 175 See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary hurdles faced by 
plaintiffs). 
 176 See, e.g., Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 432, 436–37 (Colo. App. 2007); Lenoci, 
21 A.3d at 700; Baxter v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 585, 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975). 
 177 See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text. 
 178 See, e.g., Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 593–94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing 
an exception to the intervening cause rule for custodians who know or have reason to know that an inmate 
might engage in self-destructive acts). 
 179 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 180 Courts often speak about a “duty to prevent suicide.” See, e.g., Estate of Cummings v. Davie, 
40 A.3d 971, 974 n.3 (Me. 2012) (“Courts in other jurisdictions have also held that, barring a special duty 
such as that recognized in a jailor-inmate or psychiatrist-patient relationship, there is no duty to prevent 
suicide by an adult.”); Nelson v. Driscoll, 983 P.2d 972, 980 (Mont. 1999) (discussing the “duty to prevent 
suicide” in the case of custodial relationships); McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 125 (N.H. 1983) 
(speaking in terms of “a specific duty of care to prevent suicide”). The more accurate terminology would 
be a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent suicide. 
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example, while an employer might have a duty to exercise reasonable care 
to assist an employee whom the employer knows is at risk of harm,181 an 
employer does not have a duty to take reasonable care to prevent an 
employee from committing suicide.182 Instead, the general rule has emerged 
that only defendants who have custody over others (e.g., prison officials), or 
those with special mental health training (e.g., psychiatrists), and who have 
the ability to take steps to prevent the suicide owe such a duty.183 In recent 
years, there have also been a number of claims brought against school 
officials and school districts who allegedly failed to take steps to prevent a 
student’s suicide stemming from bullying.184 Courts have shown a 
willingness to recognize the existence of such a duty in these cases.185 But 
besides these exceptions, there is generally no duty to exercise reasonable 
care to prevent another from committing suicide. 
The standard suicide rule does not serve as an absolute bar to recovery 
in these exceptional, special relationship cases because suicide is no longer 
deemed to be an unforeseeable action.186 But the standard suicide rule 
regarding causation may still limit a defendant’s liability even in these kinds 
of cases. In the prison-suicide cases, for example, courts sometimes cite the 
 
 181 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B. 
 182 See Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs, Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (questioning whether 
employer conducted an adequate background check on employee who died by suicide, but refusing to 
recognize that a special relationship existed); Olson v. Barrett, No. 6:13–cv–1886–Orl–40KRS, 2015 WL 
1277933, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015) (concluding that employer owed no duty to prevent an employee 
“from later committing suicide” where employer knew of “hateful remarks from co-workers” that 
allegedly contributed to employee’s vulnerable state of mind). 
 183 As explained by one court, 
this duty has been imposed on: (1) institutions such as jails, hospitals and reform schools, having 
actual physical custody of and control over persons; . . . and (2) persons or institutions such as 
mental hospitals, psychiatrists and other mental-health trained professionals, deemed to have a 
special training and expertise enabling them to detect mental illness and/or the potential for suicide, 
and which have the power or control necessary to prevent that suicide. 
McLaughlin, 461 A.2d at 125 (internal citations omitted). 
 184 See, e.g., Lewis v. Blue Springs Sch. Dist., No. 4:17–cv–00538–NKL, 2017 WL 5011893, at *1 
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2017); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 
2014); Butler v. Mountain View Sch. Dist., No. 3:12–CV–02038, 2013 WL 4520839, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 
Aug. 26, 2013); Ferraro v. Glendale Unified Sch. Dist., No. B262428, 2016 WL 2944268, at *7 (Cal. Ct. 
App. May 17, 2016); Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 729 (Ky. 2016); Elissa v. City of New York, 
990 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (Sup. Ct. 2014); Estate of Smith v. W. Brown Local Sch. Dist., 26 N.E.3d 890, 
896 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). 
 185 See, e.g., Walsh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (recognizing that a “strong argument” can be made that 
such a duty should exist); Patton, 529 S.W.3d at 729–30 (recognizing the existence of a duty “to supervise 
students so as to prevent bullying, to stop bullying as it occurred, and to report bullying to the 
Administrators if it occurred”). 
 186 See White v. Watson, No. 16-cv-560-JPG-DGW, 2016 WL 6277601, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 
2016) (“Where the duty of care breached is the duty to protect against what would otherwise be an 
unforeseeable consequence, that consequence becomes foreseeable to the defendant, and the breach of 
the duty to protect against it can result in negligence liability.”). 
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general suicide rule in explaining that a jailer is not liable for failing to 
prevent a prisoner’s suicide absent special circumstances.187 As one court has 
explained, “‘[s]pecial circumstances’ form the basis of virtually every 
decision involving a jailer’s liability for a prisoner’s acts of self-
destruction.”188 The key is in how a court chooses to define the concept. Most 
courts take the view that a jailer may be liable where the jailer knows or 
should have known of a prisoner’s suicidal tendencies.189 However, a few 
essentially adopt a more stringent recklessness or deliberate indifference 
standard and limit liability to where the defendant had actual knowledge that 
the decedent was likely to commit suicide.190 Therefore, even though courts 
often speak of the existence of a special relationship as creating an exception 
to the general suicide rule,191 the shadow of the standard suicide rule still 
looms in such cases. 
B. Intentional Tort Cases 
Plaintiffs who allege that a defendant’s intentional misconduct resulted 
in suicide face their own set of challenges.192 The most common intentional 
tort theory in suicide cases has been intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (IIED).193 The tort is premised on the existence of extreme and 
outrageous conduct intended to cause distress “so severe that no reasonable 
man could be expected to endure it.”194 Therefore, as one court has noted, 
IIED, “by its very nature, . . . [has a] closer connection to suicide than other 
intentional torts.”195 That said, plaintiffs alleging IIED as the underlying 
basis for a wrongful death claim have often faced difficulty satisfying the 
demanding standard that the defendant’s conduct was “extreme and 
outrageous.”196 
 
 187 See, e.g., Pretty On Top v. City of Hardin, 597 P.2d 58, 61 (Mont. 1979); Falkenstein v. City of 
Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787, 792 (N.D. 1978). 
 188 Pretty On Top, 597 P.2d at 61. 
 189 See, e.g., Cockrum v. State, 843 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 190 See, e.g., Walsh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (stating this rule in the context of school bullying case); 
Murdock v. City of Keene, 623 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1993) (stating the rule in the context of prisoner 
case). 
 191 Murdock, 623 A.2d at 756. 
 192 Not included in this discussion are cases in which a physician or other individual assists the 
decedent in the act of suicide. These cases present their own special issues. 
 193 Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 433 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Most cases applying intentional 
tort analysis in suicide cases involve intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . .”). 
 194 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Recklessness may also 
suffice in place of intent. Id. § 46(1). 
 195 Turcios v. DeBruler Co., 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1128 (Ill. 2015). 
 196 See Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 560–61, 571–72 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that middle school 
vice principal who issued an “unduly harsh” warning to a student and told the student he was going to 
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Plaintiffs seeking recovery in suicide cases may face other challenges. 
As is the case with negligence claims, establishing that the defendant’s 
conduct was a legal cause of the decedent’s suicide sometimes proves 
difficult. In the typical intentional tort case, causation typically does not pose 
much of an obstacle for a plaintiff. In the case of intentional torts, courts 
sometimes permit discovery in the case of “even very remote causation.”197 
As Professors Prosser and Keeton explain, in the case of most intentional 
torts, a defendant’s liability extends “to consequences which the defendant 
did not intend, and could not reasonably have foreseen.”198 And as every 
first-year Torts student knows, a defendant takes his plaintiff as he finds 
him.199 Thus, under the famed eggshell-plaintiff rule,  
[w]hen an actor’s tortious conduct causes harm to a person that, because of a 
preexisting physical or mental condition or other characteristics of the person, 
is of a greater magnitude or different type than might reasonably be expected, 
the actor is nevertheless subject to liability for all such harm to the person.200  
 
end up in juvenile hall, after which the student committed suicide, did not engage in extreme and 
outrageous conduct); Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 1:17–cv–01383–JBM, 2018 WL 
659862, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2018) (bullying and alleged sexual abuse by prison guards of prisoner 
with psychiatric issues not extreme and outrageous); Burdett v. Harrah’s Kan. Casino Corp., 294 F. Supp. 
2d 1215, 1236 (D. Kan. 2003) (concluding on motion to dismiss that defendant’s harassing debt collection 
methods did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct); Epelbaum v. Elf Atochem, N. Am., Inc., 
40 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433–34 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (holding that employer who permitted an allegedly hostile 
work environment to exist, under which the plaintiff suffered “mere insults or indignities” and which 
ultimately resulted in decedent’s suicide, did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct); Mikell v. 
Sch. Admin. Unit No. 33, 972 A.2d 1050, 1055 (N.H. 2009) (granting motion to dismiss where the actions 
of a special education teacher who made a false accusation against student in alleged attempt to affect 
student’s disciplinary record did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct); Meroni v. Holy 
Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (App. Div. 1986) (holding 
that brainwashing practices of church that allegedly led to decedent’s suicide were not extreme and 
outrageous); Gygi v. Storch, 503 P.2d 449, 450 (Utah 1972) (granting summary judgment where 
defendant refused to marry decedent and ended relationship with him); see also Giard v. Town of Putnam, 
No. CV085002754S, 2008 WL 5481273, at *10–11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2008) (granting motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that there had not been “affirmative misbehavior” where defendant guidance 
counselor failed to stop student’s suicide, despite allegation that defendant had “received unspecified 
information that [the student] was suicidal”). Some plaintiffs have been unable to meet the requirement 
in an IIED action that the defendant intended to cause severe emotional distress. See Corales v. Bennett, 
488 F. Supp. 2d 975, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 197 Derosier v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An 
actor who intentionally or recklessly causes harm is subject to liability for a broader range of harms than 
the harms for which that actor would be liable if only acting negligently.”). 
 198 KEETON ET AL., supra note 112, § 9, at 40. 
 199 See Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. 1988) (“It is well settled that a tortfeasor 
takes a plaintiff as he finds him.”). 
 200 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31. 
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This willingness to expand liability for intentional torts resulting in 
unforeseeable harms is traditionally justified on the grounds that one who 
intentionally causes harm has greater culpability than one who negligently 
does so.201 But in the case of recovery for suicide resulting from a defendant’s 
intentional tort, courts have developed specific causation rules that alter the 
standard approach and may significantly limit a defendant’s liability. 
1. Intentional Tort Theories as an Alternative to Negligence Claims 
Early wrongful death decisions tended not to draw any distinction 
between suicide brought about by negligent as opposed to intentional acts.202 
Instead, they sometimes spoke of the “general rule that tort actions may not 
be maintained which seek damages for the suicide of another.”203 Thus, for 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in 1921 that the 
defendants, who had allegedly confined and tortured the decedent, could not 
be held liable for the decedent’s act of hurling himself from a window to his 
death because his suicide was an intervening cause that cut off liability for 
the defendants.204 Importing principles from the negligence cases, the court 
concluded that suicide “was not the natural and probable consequence of the 
wrongful acts of the defendants.”205 A 1913 Georgia case likewise sustained 
the defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that the decedent’s suicide was not 
the natural result of the defendant’s conduct, and therefore was not the legal 
cause of the suicide, despite the allegation in the complaint that the defendant 
acted with the specific intent that the decedent would kill himself.206 
Perhaps the first decision to draw a clear distinction between an 
intentional tort claim and negligence in the context of a suicide case was Tate 
v. Canonica, a 1960 case from California.207 There, a California appellate 
court considered a wrongful death claim in which the defendants were 
alleged to have “intentionally made threats, statements and accusations 
 
 201 See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So.2d 579, 587 (Miss. 1968) (“A higher 
degree of responsibility is imposed upon a wrongdoer whose conduct was intended to cause harm than 
upon one whose conduct was negligent.”); Mayer v. Town of Hampton, 497 A.2d 1206, 1209 (N.H. 1985) 
(“The law of torts recognizes that a defendant who intentionally causes harm has greater culpability than 
one who negligently does so.”). 
 202 See Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 F. 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1921) (“[I]t is now well established that no action 
lies at common law to recover damages for causing the death of a human being by the wrongful or 
negligent act of another.”). 
 203 Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1209. 
 204 Salsedo, 278 F. at 99. 
 205 Id. at 96. 
 206 Stevens v. Steadman, 79 S.E. 564, 566–67 (Ga. 1913); see also Waas v. Ashland Day & Night 
Bank, 257 S.W. 29, 31 (Ky. 1923) (sustaining defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that it was not 
foreseeable that plaintiff would commit suicide after being falsely accused of a crime and threatened with 
imprisonment). 
 207 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Ct. App. 1960). 
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against [the] deceased for the purpose of harassing, embarrassing, and 
humiliating him in the presence of friends, relatives and business 
associates.”208 The resulting emotional distress eventually led to the 
decedent’s suicide.209 
The court began by noting that the law had long drawn a distinction 
between intentional torts and negligence and did not place as many 
restrictions on the concept of causation in the case of intentional 
wrongdoing.210 Consequently, the court refused to import the foreseeability 
and superseding cause concepts from negligence law.211 Once this distinction 
was recognized, it became a relatively simple matter for the court to conclude 
that liability could exist for intentional misconduct resulting in suicide. 
Under the court’s rule, “where the defendant intended, by his conduct, to 
cause serious mental distress or serious physical suffering, and does so, and 
such mental distress is shown by the evidence to be ‘a substantial factor in 
bringing about’ the suicide, a cause of action for wrongful death results.”212 
Importantly, the court also decided not to import the delirium or insanity rule 
used in negligence cases. Citing tort law’s longstanding reluctance to 
recognize fewer defenses in the case of intentional torts as opposed to 
negligence torts, the court concluded that the fact that the decedent was 
insane or could not resist the impulse to commit suicide was irrelevant for 
purposes of liability.213 
Following Tate, several other courts declined to import the special 
causation rules from negligence cases into intentional tort claims involving 
suicide.214 In at least two instances, however, courts have modified the other 
elements of the Tate approach. In Mayer v. Town of Hampton, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court analogized a wrongful death claim involving 
suicide to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.215 
Consequently, the court added the requirement that the defendant’s conduct 
must be extreme and outrageous before liability can attach,216 thereby 
narrowing the scope of liability articulated in Tate. In contrast, the Wyoming 
 
 208 Id. at 30–31. 
 209 Id. at 31. 
 210 Id. at 33. 
 211 Id. at 35–36. 
 212 Id. at 36 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL HARMS TO PERSONS, LAND, AND 
CHATTELS §§ 279–80 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)). 
 213 Id. at 33, 36. 
 214 Other decisions recognizing the potential for liability soon followed. See Rowe v. Marder, 750 F. 
Supp. 718, 724 (W.D. Pa. 1990); Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121, 128 (Ind. 1994); Clift v. 
Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 811 (R.I. 1996); R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 31 (Wyo. 1994). 
 215 497 A.2d 1206, 1210–11 (N.H. 1985). 
 216 Id. at 1211. 
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Supreme Court has held that one whose intentional tort causes an emotional 
or psychiatric illness that is a substantial factor in bringing about the suicide 
of the victim may be liable “even though he does not intend to cause the 
emotional or psychiatric illness.”217 
2. Special Intentional Tort Rules in Suicide Cases: The Substantial 
Factor Rule 
Following Tate, most of the courts to consider the issue have similarly 
decided against importing foreseeability principles from negligence law. But 
like Tate, they have adopted a different causation standard than that which 
typically applies in intentional tort cases. Under this approach, a plaintiff 
may recover where a defendant acts with the intent to cause physical or 
emotional harm and the conduct was a substantial factor in causing the 
suicide.218 Courts adopting the substantial factor test frequently refer to the 
test as being more stringent than the ordinary causation standard in 
intentional tort cases.219 According to a federal court in Pennsylvania, the 
substantial factor standard is justified because in the case of suicide, “the 
final cause of death always appears as an independent act of a separate will, 
always raising the very real possibility that the suicide was truly unrelated to 
the defendant’s actions.”220 According to the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court, “[p]roof of the substantial causation will usually be based on expert 
testimony.”221 
In practice, the substantial factor standard has not proven to be a 
particularly onerous requirement for plaintiffs.222 Indeed, “the fact that a 
decedent has a history of mental instability is no automatic bar to finding the 
defendant’s conduct to be a substantial factor in causing the suicide.”223 As 
explained by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, “[s]o long as the 
defendant’s wrongful act was a substantial cause of the suicide, there is no 
 
 217 R.D., 875 P.2d at 31. 
 218 See Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 724 (discussing the approach of most courts); see also N. Shore 
Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Breslin Assocs. Consulting LLC, No. 02–11760–NG, 2004 WL 6001505, at *5 
(D. Mass. June 22, 2004) (applying the rule); Collins v. Village of Woodridge, 96 F. Supp. 2d 744, 756 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (same); Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 184–85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) 
(adopting the substantial factor test); Kimberlin, 637 N.E.2d at 127–28 (citing prior decisions and 
applying the rule); Clift, 688 A.2d at 812 (citing Tate and adopting its test). 
 219 See Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 724 (explaining that the substantial factor test imposes “a greater 
standard of causation than might otherwise be required”); Clift, 688 A.2d at 812 (explaining that the 
substantial factor test is “certainly a more stringent test than that employed in typical intentional infliction 
of emotional distress cases”). 
 220 Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 724. 
 221 Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1211. 
 222 But see Dargie v. County of Hillsborough, No. 93-391-SD, 1995 WL 73339, at *8 (D.N.H. Feb. 
23, 1995) (holding that plaintiff failed to meet the substantial causation standard). 
 223 Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1211. 
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reason in such a case to undermine to [sic] the policy behind intentional torts 
which extends a defendant’s liability almost without limit to any actual harm 
resulting.”224 
3. Special Intentional Tort Rules in Suicide Cases: The 
Foreseeability Rule 
Other courts have adopted an alternative approach that applies 
foreseeability principles from negligence law to intentional tort cases to limit 
defendants’ liability. A 2015 decision from a South Carolina federal district 
court directly imported the standard suicide rule from negligence cases in 
holding that suicide constitutes an intervening force that breaks the chain of 
causation.225 To prevail, the plaintiff must fit within either the irresistible 
impulse or special relationship exceptions.226 
The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted a similar foreseeability 
standard in suicide wrongful death cases involving intentional wrongdoing 
on the part of a defendant. Rejecting the traditional causation standard that 
applies in intentional tort cases, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a 
“plaintiff must plead facts which, if proven, would overcome application of 
the general rule that suicide is deemed unforeseeable as a matter of law.”227 
The plaintiff must ultimately establish that the suicide was foreseeable, 
which, under the court’s approach, means that suicide “was a likely result of 
the defendant’s conduct.”228 
4. Special Intentional Tort Rules in Suicide Cases: The Irresistible 
Impulse Rule 
A handful of courts have held that there can be no recovery for wrongful 
death suicide unless the decedent acted from an uncontrollable impulse and 
the defendant’s intentional tort was a substantial cause of the decedent’s 
impulse.229 Mississippi first adopted this rule in 1968 in a case involving 
abuse of process on the part of various defendants to collect debts from the 
decedent that ultimately led to the decedent’s suicide.230 In reaching its 
decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court referred to several negligence cases 
as well as Tate and several pre-Tate intentional tort cases involving 
 
 224 Id. 
 225 Watson v. Adams, No. 4:12–cv–03436–BHH, 2015 WL 1486869, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2015). 
 226 Id. at *8. 
 227 Turcios v. DeBruler Co., 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1128 (Ill. 2015). 
 228 Id. 
 229 State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579, 587 (Miss. 1968); see also Hare v. City 
of Corinth, 814 F. Supp. 1312, 1326 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (applying this rule); Cauverien v. De Metz, 
188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (same). 
 230 Richardson, 214 So. 2d at 584. 
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suicide.231 Ultimately, the court cobbled together a rule that combined 
aspects of both lines of cases, borrowing the uncontrollable impulse concept 
from negligence cases and the substantial factor language from Tate.232 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO SUICIDE IN TORT LAW 
As one reviews the cases involving potential liability for suicide, 
several fact patterns reappear frequently. There is the harassing, abusive, or 
bullying behavior that results in suicide.233 There is the negligent entrustment 
or sale of a firearm or drugs to the individual who later kills himself.234 There 
is the friend, counselor, or other confidant who fails to take action to prevent 
the decedent from committing suicide.235 There is the landlord,236 
employer,237 or other individual who arguably has a special relationship with 
 
 231 Id. at 586–87. 
 232 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Mississippi case law on the subject of liability for 
negligence in suicide cases seemed, until recently, to be quite restrictive. See Truddle v. Baptist Mem’l 
Hosp.–De Soto, Inc., 150 So. 3d 692, 697 (Miss. 2014) (“Nothing in Mississippi caselaw, save the 
irresistible-impulse doctrine . . . abrogates the general rule that suicide constitutes ‘an independent, 
intervening and superseding event that severs the causal nexus between any wrongful action on the part 
of the defendant.’” (quoting Shamburger v. Grand Casino of Miss., Inc./Biloxi, 84 F. Supp. 2d 794, 798 
(S.D. Miss. 1998))); Collins ex rel. Irby v. Madakasira, No. 2015–CA–01759–COA, 2017 WL 9480890, 
at *7 (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017) (“Truddle clearly states that an intentional act must be pled to support 
a cause of action for suicide.”). In 2018, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized that liability could 
attach in a case in which the decedent was under the custody and control of a medical facility and the 
facility’s negligence helped lead to the decedent’s suicide. Singing River Health Sys. v. Vermilyea, 
242 So. 3d 74, 83 (Miss. 2018). 
 233 See, e.g., MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 736 (6th Cir. 2007) (harassing debt 
collection); Burdett v. Harrah’s Kan. Casino Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1235 (D. Kan. 2003) (harassing 
debt collection); Halko v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 135, 141–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(harassing supervisors); Doe v. Doe, 67 N.E.3d 520, 524 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (bullying of minor); Laytart 
v. Laytart, No. 5-94-11, 1994 WL 463777, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1994) (sexual abuse of a minor); 
Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tenn. 1965) (domestic abuse). 
 234 See, e.g., Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (sale of firearm 
ammunition); Kelly v. Echols, No. CIV-F-05-118 AWI DLB, 2008 WL 4163221, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 
4, 2008) (sale of prescription drugs); Prill v. Marone, 23 So. 3d 1, 7 (Ala. 2009) (negligent entrustment); 
see also Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1277 (Ala. 1993) (negligent entrustment); Tonn v. 
Moore, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0372, 2013 WL 1858773, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013) (negligent 
entrustment); Scoggins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 564, 567–68 (Iowa 1997) (sale of 
ammunition to minor); Delaney v. Reynolds, 825 N.E.2d 554, 559 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (negligent 
entrustment); Splawnik v. DiCaprio, 540 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (App. Div. 1989) (negligent entrustment); 
Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (sale of ammunition to minor). 
 235 See, e.g., Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (companion); Nally v. 
Grace Cmty. Church, 763 P.2d 948, 957 (Cal. 1988) (religious counselor); Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 
324, 341–42 (Haw. 1996) (veterans’ counselor); Lenoci v. Leonard, 21 A.3d 694, 698 (Vt. 2011) (friend). 
 236 See Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (Mont. 1989) (holding that landlord did not have duty to 
prevent suicide). 
 237 See Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding employer not 
liable for security guard’s suicide using company-issued firearm); Olson v. Barrett, No. 6:13–cv–1886–
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the decedent238 who fails to take action to prevent the decedent’s suicide. And 
there is the more generic case in which the defendant’s negligence causes 
physical or emotional harm to the decedent that ultimately leads to the 
decedent’s death.239 
Each of these cases involves its own tragic set of facts. Each is painful 
to read. But most share one common thread: the plaintiff loses on the issue 
of duty or proximate cause.240 There are certainly exceptions, such as the 
cases in which a defendant retains custody of an individual and has reason 
to know of the individual’s suicidal tendencies.241 But the fact that the 
decedent has committed suicide usually makes it quite difficult for the 
plaintiff to recover, at least where the defendant’s affirmative conduct is 
alleged to have resulted in suicide. 
As the following Part argues, while the actual results in many suicide 
cases are not particularly problematic, the manner in which courts arrive at 
those results and the message that the suicide rule sends about suicide and 
mental health are often troublesome. In addition, the failure of courts to 
engage in any meaningful analysis regarding proximate cause in these cases 
and the special causation rules some courts have developed in intentional tort 
cases sometimes lead to problematic results. 
A. Nonproblematic Results 
The standard suicide rule in tort law is a rule regarding proximate 
cause.242 As explained by Professor Dan Dobbs, “[t]he most general and 
pervasive approach to . . . proximate cause holds that a negligent defendant 
is liable for all the general kinds of harms he foreseeably risked by his 
negligent conduct and to the class of persons he put at risk by that 
conduct.”243 The general rule treating suicide as an unforeseeable kind of 
harm is generally consistent with the medical research regarding suicide. 
In 2003, the American Psychiatric Association developed assessment 
guidelines to help mental health professionals assess the risk of suicide in 
 
Orl–40KRS, 2015 WL 1277933, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015) (noting that suicide did not occur “in 
the scope or course of employment”). 
 238 See McPeake v. Cannon, 553 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (attorney); McLaughlin v. 
Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 127 (N.H. 1983) (attorney). 
 239 See Scheffer v. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249, 252 (1881) (holding railway company not liable for 
suicide of passenger injured in train collision). 
 240 See, e.g., Laytart v. Laytart, No. 5-94-11, 1994 WL 463777, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1994) 
(affirming dismissal on the pleadings in case of sexual abuse of a minor resulting in suicide on the grounds 
that suicide is intervening act that breaks the chain of causation). 
 241 See, e.g., P.W. v. Children’s Hosp., 364 P.3d 891, 896 (Colo. 2016). 
 242 See supra notes 115–30 and accompanying text. 
 243 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 198 (2d ed. 2011). 
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patients.244 The guidelines were developed after a review of over thirty years 
of research and literature in the field.245 However, considerable doubt within 
the psychiatric field as to how effective existing risk assessment methods are 
at predicting the risk of suicide in specific cases has existed for some time.246 
A 2016 meta-analysis examined thirty-seven longitudinal studies involving 
psychiatric patients or people who had made suicide attempts and who had 
been classified as being at high or low risks of suicide.247 The study found 
that the proportion of suicides among the high-risk patients was 5.5%, in 
contrast with 0.9% among lower risk patients, suggesting “a statistically 
strong association between high-risk strata and completed suicide.”248 
However, the meta-analysis also revealed “that about half of all suicides are 
likely to occur in lower-risk groups” and that “95% of high-risk patients will 
not suicide.”249 Thus, despite over forty years of study, the authors concluded 
that “[a] statistically strong and reliable method to usefully distinguish 
patients with a high-risk of suicide remains elusive.”250 
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. A separate 2016 meta-
analysis published in the British Journal of Psychiatry found that 
there is no robust evidence to support the use of one risk scale over another, and 
because all the scales reviewed had a low [positive predictive value] with 
significant numbers of false positives these scales should not be used in clinical 
practice alone to assess the future risk of suicide.251 
Researchers who attempted to identify patients at risk for suicide among 
4800 veterans admitted for in-patient psychiatric care were unsuccessful in 
their efforts, leading to the conclusion that “[i]dentification of particular 
 
 244 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF 
PATIENTS WITH SUICIDAL BEHAVIORS (2003), https://psychiatryonline.org/pb/assets/raw/sitewide/ 
practice_guidelines/guidelines/suicide.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCM8-28JW]. 
 245 Id. at 7. 
 246 See Albert M. Drukteinis, Psychiatric Perspectives on Civil Liability for Suicide, 13 BULL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 71, 80 (1985) (“In general, psychiatric prediction of a patient’s potential for 
suicide is being questioned more and more.”). 
 247 Matthew Large et al., Meta-Analysis of Longitudinal Cohort Studies of Suicide Risk Assessment 
Among Psychiatric Patients: Heterogeneity in Results and Lack of Improvement over Time, PLOS ONE 
(June 1, 2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0156322 [https://perma. 
cc/9932-F8HH]. 
 248 Id. at 1–2, 12. 
 249 Id. at 12. 
 250 Id. at 2. 
 251 Melissa K.Y. Chan et al., Predicting Suicide Following Self-harm: Systematic Review of Risk 
Factors and Risk Scales, 209 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 277, 281 (2016), https://www.cambridge.org/ 
core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/C9D595168EDF06401A823E2E968915E1/ 
S000712500024511Xa.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ45-5TGS]. 
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persons who will commit suicide is not currently feasible.”252 There are 
certainly identifiable factors that increase the risk of suicide. For example, a 
2009 study found that of patients who had been hospitalized after a suicide 
attempt, nearly one-third of those who had psychotic symptoms attempted 
suicide at least one more time, thus leading to the conclusion that 
“[p]sychotic symptoms during major depressive episode increase the risk of 
completed suicide after serious suicide attempt.”253 But predicting those who 
are most at risk of suicide remains frustratingly difficult.254 
The fact that suicide remains an unpredictable occurrence to trained 
experts speaks to the foreseeability of suicide for purposes of tort law. 
Predictability is not the same thing as foreseeability.255 But foreseeability 
does involve some measure of probability of an event’s occurrence. And if 
an event occurs infrequently enough under a given set of facts to be 
unpredictable, this impacts the foreseeability of the event.256 Moreover, 
foreseeability is typically assessed from the perspective of the hypothetical 
reasonable person. If experts with superior knowledge regarding suicide 
have been unable to develop a reliable method for determining those at a 
high risk of suicide, the hypothetical reasonable person will ordinarily not be 
able to do better.257 
Even where emotional distress is within the foreseeable scope of risk 
resulting from a defendant’s conduct, it is the unusual case in which suicide 
is the kind of harm foreseeably risked. One can easily foresee that an 
intentional wrong or the failure to exercise reasonable care could result in 
emotional distress. But the foreseeable scope-of-risk analysis involved in 
proximate cause determinations involves consideration of degrees. Burning 
resulting from an explosion caused by an unpredictable chemical reaction is 
a different kind of harm than injury resulting from being accidentally 
 
 252 Alex D. Pokorny, Prediction of Suicide in Psychiatric Patients. Report of a Prospective Study, 
40 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249, 249 (1983), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/ 
fullarticle/492987 [https://perma.cc/2H8F-WHKN]. 
 253 Kirsi Suominen et al., Outcome of Patients with Major Depressive Disorder After Serious Suicide 
Attempt, 70 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1372, 1372 (2009), 
http://www.psychiatrist.com/JCP/article/Pages/2009/v70n10/v70n1005.aspx [https://perma.cc/8MLF-
SNSM]. 
 254 See Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Suicide: Unpredictable and Unavoidable—Proposed 
Guidelines Provide Rational Test for Physician’s Liability, 71 NEB. L. REV. 643, 644 (1992) (“In fact, 
predictions of the likelihood a specific individual will commit suicide are wrong far more often than they 
are right.”). 
 255 See Drukteinis, supra note 246, at 80 (stating that “the legal use of the term foreseeability and the 
concept of predictability are not synonymous”). 
 256 See id. 
 257 See id. (stating that “if professionals trained in mental health cannot prevent suicide or even 
predict it accurately, then the average citizen certainly has no way of predicting it”). 
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splashed by hot liquid.258 It is not simply the fact that one injury is more 
substantial than the other that may take one of the harms outside the scope 
of risk. It is the fact that the essence or fundamental nature of the injuries are 
different in kind. Suicide involves emotional distress plus the intentional act 
of the decedent. In this respect, suicide is ultimately a harm that is different 
in kind than the emotional distress that tort law recognizes as a compensable 
injury. It is the unusual case where suicide is the kind of harm that a 
defendant foreseeably risked by his negligent conduct. Thus, as a general 
proposition, the special causation rules in suicide cases usually produce the 
correct result. 
B. Problematic Reasoning (and Sometimes Problematic Results) 
1. Problematic Reasoning: Proximate Cause 
Rote application of the suicide rule produces the correct result in the 
run of cases. But not always. In some instances, a court’s application of the 
rule effectively short-circuits any real analysis into whether the decedent’s 
suicide was within the scope of foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s 
negligence. 
For example, in R.D. v. W.H., a Wyoming case, the decedent’s family 
was able to state a claim by successfully invoking the delirium or insanity 
exception to the traditional suicide rule in a negligence case after the court 
had explained that suicide is ordinarily treated as an intervening cause that 
breaks the chain of causation.259 But it is difficult to understand why there 
was a need to resort to the exception in the first place when application of 
traditional foreseeable scope-of-risk analysis would almost certainly have 
resulted in a jury question. According to the complaint, the defendant (the 
decedent’s stepfather) had allegedly sexually abused the decedent 
throughout her entire life to the point that she developed psychiatric 
difficulties and attempted suicide on several previous occasions.260 The 
defendant loaned a gun to the decedent, which she used to try to kill herself; 
five days later, the defendant helped the decedent obtain a prescription for 
medicine—the same medicine that the defendant knew or should have 
known the decedent had used in a previous attempt to kill herself.261 On this 
occasion, she was successful.262 There is nothing wrong with articulating a 
general rule that suicide is not the sort of resulting harm that is foreseeable 
from one’s negligence. But in this instance, common sense would suggest 
 
 258 See Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1964] 1 Q.B. 518 (Eng.). 
 259 875 P.2d 26, 28–29 (Wyo. 1994). 
 260 Id. at 28. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. 
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that suicide was the exact harm a reasonable person could foresee by 
assisting the decedent in obtaining the prescription. As such, the decedent’s 
acts cannot be viewed as a superseding cause if that term is to have any 
meaning.263 
The fact that the defendant in R.D. v. W.H. had, according to the 
complaint, contributed to the decedent’s psychiatric problems through 
repeated sexual abuse only strengthens the case for foreseeability. Suicide is 
admittedly difficult to predict.264 But there is also a correlation between 
sexual and other forms of abuse with long-term psychological problems and 
risk of suicide.265 As an example, according to one study, “heterosexual 
women who had experienced physical violence by a partner were more than 
seven times more likely to report current suicidal ideation than their 
counterparts who had not experienced” such violence.266 
Courts’ tendency to apply the traditional suicide rule in cases of alleged 
negligence involving abusers and to apply similar foreseeability concepts to 
claims founded on intentional misconduct precludes jurors from hearing 
expert testimony that might shed light on the causal connection (if any) 
between the defendant’s conduct and the ensuing suicide. For example, in a 
Tennessee case, the decedent’s boyfriend “had broken her leg, burned her 
with a cigarette, blacked her eyes, kicked her, [] caused her to be bruised and 
discolored over large areas,” and forcibly retrieved her from another state 
after she had attempted to leave him.267 Eventually, the decedent jumped to 
her death after writing a suicide note ascribing her actions to the abuse she 
 
 263 See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. 2006) (“Where the 
intervening act’s risk is the very same risk that renders the original actor negligent, the intervening act 
cannot serve as a superseding cause.”). 
 264 See supra notes 244–54 and accompanying text. 
 265 See Peter J. Fagan et al., Pedophilia, 288 JAMA 2458, 2460 (2002) (noting that child victims of 
sexual abuse are at higher risk for mood disorders and suicide). 
 266 See Courtenay E. Cavanaugh et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Suicidal Behavior Among Adult 
Female Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, 41 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 372, 372–73 
(2011); see also John Briere & Lisa Y. Zaidi, Sexual Abuse Histories and Sequelae in Female Psychiatric 
Emergency Room Patients, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1602, 1602 (1989) (noting that studies “tend to 
document high rates of anxiety, depression, dissociation, self-destructiveness, substance abuse, and 
interpersonal dysfunction in [male and female] adults who were molested as children” as well as more 
frequent diagnoses of borderline personality disorder); Elizabeth Oddone Paolucci et al., A Meta-Analysis 
of the Published Research on the Effects of Child Sexual Abuse, 135 J. PSYCHOL. 17, 17 (2001) (reporting 
“clear evidence confirming the link between” childhood sexual abuse and posttraumatic stress disorder, 
depression, suicide, sexual promiscuity, victim–perpetrator cycle, and poor academic performance); 
Melissa K. Holt et al., Bullying and Suicidal Ideation and Behaviors: A Meta-Analysis, 135 PEDIATRICS 
e496, e496 (2015) (conducting meta-analysis and concluding “that involvement in bullying in any 
capacity is associated with suicidal ideation and behavior”). 
 267 Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tenn. 1965). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
806 
had suffered.268 Nonetheless, the Tennessee Supreme Court, applying the 
suicide rule without further inquiry, affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
sustain the defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that the decedent’s suicide 
was unforeseeable and “an abnormal thing.”269 
In an Ohio case, the complaint alleged that a teenager died by suicide 
as a result of having been sexually abused by an adult.270 In a brief opinion 
affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, the Ohio appellate court 
perfunctorily cited the standard rule that suicide is generally an intervening 
cause that breaks the chain of causation.271 The court then noted that there 
was no allegation in the complaint that the alleged abuser knew or should 
have known the teen was suicidal when he was abusing the teen, nor was 
there any allegation that suicide “is a normal incident of the risk involved in” 
sexual abuse of a teen.272 As such, dismissal was proper.273 
These kinds of cases present special circumstances that take them 
outside of the confines of the standard rule regarding suicide and causation. 
Where the risk of the decedent’s act is the same risk that renders the 
defendant’s conduct negligent to begin with, the intervening act cannot serve 
as a superseding cause.274 If a defendant’s own extreme conduct foreseeably 
risks severe emotional injury, the foreseeability arguments and arguments 
about the extreme nature of the decedent’s own acts carry considerably less 
weight. When current science and everyday experience suggest that a 
defendant’s conduct substantially increased the risk of suicide, it is the worst 
sort of legal fiction to argue that the decedent’s actions were a superseding 
cause and that a jury could reach no other conclusion. 
2. Comparative Fault Problems 
A problem related to this short-circuited proximate cause analysis 
involves the defense of comparative fault. Courts sometimes explain that the 
decedent’s suicide was “the sole proximate cause” of death.275 The idea that 
 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. at 222. 
 270 Laytart v. Laytart, No. 5-94-11, 1994 WL 463777, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1994). 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. 2006) (“Where the 
intervening act’s risk is the very same risk that renders the original actor negligent, the intervening act 
cannot serve as a superseding cause.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor’s liability is limited to those physical harms 
that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”). 
 275 See, e.g., La Quinta Inns, Inc. v. Leech, 658 S.E.2d 637, 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he evidence 
demands a finding that Mr. Leech’s act of suicide was the sole proximate cause of his death . . . .”); Jones 
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the decedent’s suicide is the sole proximate cause of death was devised at a 
time when the all-or-nothing defense of contributory negligence was the 
norm.276 Given the choice of assigning responsibility for a suicide to one of 
the two parties, the choice to assign it to the decedent made sense. The use 
of the term “sole proximate cause” was certainly unfortunate in that it implies 
that there can be only one proximate cause of an injury.277 But the idea was 
nonetheless defensible. 
With tort law’s switch to comparative fault, however, the idea that the 
decedent’s suicide was always the sole proximate cause ceased to be 
persuasive. Cases outside of the suicide context in which the acts of both the 
plaintiff and defendant were found to be proximate causes of the plaintiff’s 
injuries and the plaintiff’s recovery was proportionally reduced became 
commonplace following the switch to comparative fault.278 Underlying the 
switch from a contributory negligence to comparative negligence regime 
were concerns over fairness; while the plaintiff’s own fault should justifiably 
limit recovery, the defendant could sometimes rightfully be expected to bear 
some portion of the responsibility.279 Yet, the idea that the decedent’s 
decision to take her life was the sole proximate cause of death remained 
rooted in tort law with little acknowledgment that both parties could share 
legal responsibility for an outcome. In this respect, blind application of the 
idea that suicide is the sole proximate cause of the decedent’s death serves 
as the functional, if not intentional, equivalent of the old contributory 
negligence bar. As Professor Joe King notes, “[t]he serious misconduct bar 
reinvests the effect of the plaintiff’s fault with a complete bar potential 
despite a comparative fault scheme, and thus legitimizes an avenue for the 
court to end-run the jury.”280 As a result, application of the principle may 
sometimes undermine the fairness and proportionality concerns underlying 
comparative fault rules.281 
 
v. Stewart, 191 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tenn. 1946) (“This intervening act of the deceased, and not the tort of 
the defendant, must be regarded as the sole proximate cause of that death.”). 
 276 The switch from contributory negligence to comparative negligence began in the 1960s and 
1970s. See Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative: Which Is the 
Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 43 (2003). 
 277 See generally Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Mich. 1988) (“The facts of this 
case illustrate the principle that there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury.”). 
 278 See, e.g., Breaux v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc.-Gulfport, 854 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2003) (explaining that when there is more than one proximate cause, comparative negligence principles 
apply). 
 279 See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar 
in Tort Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1062–63 (2002). 
 280 Id. at 1067–68. 
 281 See id. at 1063. 
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C. Problematic Messages 
1. Value Judgments 
The special causation rules that apply in the case of suicide represent a 
departure from traditional tort principles. It is certainly not uncommon for 
special tort rules to develop based on policy or moral judgments. But the 
concern in suicide cases is that courts may be applying moral judgments that 
were developed centuries ago at a time when societal views on suicide were 
evolving. 
There are other examples in which tort law departs from its traditional 
principles for particular groups of plaintiffs. For example, standard tort 
principles would permit a plaintiff to hold a defendant liable where the 
plaintiff was injured after engaging in unwise or dangerous conduct and this 
conduct was foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the defendant’s 
negligence.282 It is the unusual case in which the plaintiff’s own negligence 
is treated as the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. But where, 
for example, a bartender serves an obviously intoxicated patron and that 
patron drives under the influence and injures himself, the majority rule is that 
the patron may not recover from the individual who provided the alcohol.283 
Some courts explicitly ground their conclusions on the notion that a patron’s 
actions in such cases are the sole proximate cause of the injuries.284 
This rule in dram shop cases is obviously driven more by policy than 
by logic. One of the foreseeable risks one contributes to by serving alcohol 
to a visibly intoxicated individual is obviously that the individual will injure 
himself in addition to others. Yet, the majority rule is grounded on the notion 
 
 282 The plaintiff’s recovery might be limited by comparative negligence principles in such instances. 
 283 See Bertelmann v. TAAS Assocs., 735 P.2d 930, 934 n.3 (Haw. 1987) (stating that the majority 
rule is that “neither minors nor adults who hurt themselves after becoming intoxicated possess a cause of 
action against whoever provided them with liquor”). Statutes play an important part in the law in this 
area. See Cuevas v. Royal D’Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 348 (Miss. 1986) (“[W]e do not think the 
legislature intended to impose liability upon a dispenser of intoxicants to an adult individual, such as 
appellant here, who voluntarily consumes intoxicants and then, by reason of his inebriated condition, 
injures himself.”); Richard Smith, Note, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal 
for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 563 (2000) (“Relatively few states allow an intoxicated adult 
patron to recover from the dramshop for injuries caused by his own intoxication.”). 
 284 See Bennett v. Godfather’s Pizza, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“The 
rationale for not holding the establishment liable is that the voluntary drinking of the alcohol, not the 
furnishing of [the alcohol], [is] the proximate cause of the injury.” (internal quotations omitted)); 
Bertelmann, 735 P.2d at 933 (“Drunken persons who harm themselves are solely responsible for their 
voluntary intoxication and cannot prevail under a common law or statutory basis.”); Smith v. Tenth 
Inning, 551 N.E.2d 1296, 1298–99 (Ohio 1990) (treating the plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol as the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries in such cases); McClelland v. Harvie Kothe-Ed Rieman, Post 
No. 1201, Veterans of the Foreign Wars of the U.S., Inc., 770 P.2d 569, 572 (Okla. 1989) (“Claims do 
not lie against liquor vendors because—at common law—it is the drink’s voluntary consumption rather 
than its sale that constitutes the proximate cause of the injuries sought to be redressed.”). 
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that a person should not be permitted to benefit “by his or her own wrongful 
act.”285 
Professor King has explored the idea that courts sometimes recognize a 
special doctrine barring tort claims arising out of serious misconduct.286 King 
cites as one of his many examples a case in which a teenager was killed by 
an unsecured vending machine that fell when he was attempting to steal 
drinks.287 The Alabama Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s subsequent 
products liability claim was barred on the grounds that “[a] person cannot 
maintain a cause of action if, in order to establish it, he must rely in whole 
or part on an illegal or immoral act.”288 As in the dram shop cases, the 
primary justification for what King calls this “serious misconduct bar” is the 
notion that a wrongdoer engaged in serious misconduct should not be 
permitted to benefit from his wrongdoing by recovering damages.289 King’s 
survey of the decisional law reveals that sometimes the “serious misconduct 
bar” he identifies operates less explicitly.290 In some cases, courts formally 
treat the plaintiff’s misconduct as the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
own injuries, despite the negligence of the defendant.291 But as King 
observes, what courts are actually doing is applying the serious misconduct 
bar under the guise of proximate cause.292 
The judicial treatment of suicide cases follows a similar format. A few 
courts have expressly applied the serious misconduct bar in suicide cases.293 
More commonly, courts treat a decedent’s suicide as so extreme or abnormal 
 
 285 Buntin v. Hutton, 206 Ill. App. 194, 199 (App. Ct. 1917); see also Smith, 551 N.E.2d at 1298 
(“Clearly, permitting the intoxicated patron a cause of action in this context would simply send the wrong 
message to all our citizens, because such a message would essentially state that a patron who has 
purchased alcoholic beverages from a permit holder may drink such alcohol with unbridled, unfettered 
impunity and with full knowledge that the permit holder will be ultimately responsible for any harm 
caused by the patron’s intoxication.”). 
 286 King, supra note 279, at 1015. 
 287 Id. at 1023 (discussing Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, Inc., 621 So. 2d 953, 954 
(Ala. 1993)). 
 288 Oden, 621 So. 2d at 954–55 (quoting Hinkle v. Ry. Express Agency, 6 So. 2d 417, 421 (Ala. 
1942)). 
 289 King, supra note 279, at 1017. The dram shop cases are, in some instances, examples of the 
serious misconduct bar in action. See Alison K. Goodwin, Comment, One Drunk Driver, Shame on You, 
Two Drunk Drivers, Shame on Who: Reconciling the Unlawful Acts Doctrine with Comparative Fault, 
48 N.M. L. REV. 173, 188 (2018) (discussing New Mexico’s “complicity doctrine” in the context of dram 
shop cases). 
 290 King, supra note 279, at 1016. 
 291 See id. at 1063–64 (discussing cases). 
 292 Id. at 1064. 
 293 See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. As Professor King notes, there are relatively few 
cases in which courts explicitly invoke the serious misconduct rule in barring a plaintiff’s claim in a 
suicide case. King, supra note 279, at 1028–29. 
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as to be the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.294 The history of 
the suicide rule leaves little doubt that the rule developed, at least in part, 
from the historical view that suicide was a criminal or immoral act.295 
Regardless of whether a court expressly applies the serious misconduct bar 
or does so under the guise of proximate cause, those who commit suicide are 
grouped with drunk drivers, thieves, and others whose acts take them outside 
the protection of the law.296 
The fact that courts sometimes make policy judgments as part of the 
proximate cause element is hardly surprising. The proximate cause element 
exists in large measure to ensure that liability is not limitless, and the limits 
that courts impose are often based on policy concerns and notions of 
fairness.297 But in the case of the special causation rules for suicide cases, 
courts are applying legal rules that have their origin at a time when suicide 
was widely viewed as sinful and a crime.298 While U.S. society continues to 
view suicide as a tragedy, societal attitudes have evolved since the days when 
courts could describe the act as sinful or immoral without fear of 
contradiction.299 
Citing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Judge David L. Bazelon 
once observed that “the continued vitality of the common law, including the 
law of torts, depends upon its ability to reflect contemporary community 
 
 294 See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 295 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 296 The delirium or insanity exception to the general suicide rule likewise reflects a morality-based 
judgment upon those who commit suicide. The insanity or delirium exception is less a rule about causation 
than it is a value judgment as to the relative blameworthiness of the parties. The question of whether a 
defendant’s conduct resulted in the decedent being insane or unable to resist an impulse to commit suicide 
has virtually no relation to the question of whether the defendant’s conduct resulted in a foreseeable risk 
of suicide. Instead, like the M’Naghten rule in criminal law, the insanity or delirium exception reflects a 
value choice as to the blameworthiness or culpability of the decedent. See generally Bruce J. Winick, The 
Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 832 (2009) (explaining that the M’Naghten test “focus[es] on cognitive impairment 
produced by mental illness that reduces culpability to the extent that the offender is not blameworthy for 
his conduct”). The fact that the decedent was supposedly insane at the time of suicide absolves the 
decedent of all legal and moral blame for the suicide. See Baker v. Bd. of Fire Pension Fund Comm’rs, 
123 P. 344, 345 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912) (explaining that the decedent “cannot be said to have been the 
cause, either morally or legally, of his own death” when his actions were the result of his insanity). 
 297 See, e.g., Ashley Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Proximate cause is 
bottomed on public policy as a limitation on how far society is willing to extend liability for a defendant’s 
actions.”); Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 222 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1966) (“Some boundary must be set to 
liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.” (quoting 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 240–41 (3d ed. 1964))). 
 298 See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 299 See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
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values and ethics.”300 Tort law in particular “operates as a vehicle through 
which communities perpetually reexamine and communicate their values.”301 
Yet, courts have developed a morality-based rule and encased it in amber in 
the face of evolving societal attitudes and better psychological understanding 
of suicide. In the process, they may sometimes send a message about the 
nature of suicide that is no longer shared by the broader community. 
2. The “Rage or Frenzy” (or “Delirium or Insanity”) Exception 
The “rage or frenzy”/“delirium or insanity” exception presents a similar 
problem in terms of messaging. As an initial matter, “insanity” is a legal 
concept, not a medical one.302 The terms “rage” and “frenzy” have even less 
medical significance. But not only are the terms unhelpful in helping juries 
understand the relevant concepts,303 they are actually harmful in terms of 
promoting misunderstandings and negative stereotypes. 
The use of the term “frenzy”—with its medieval origins304—conjures 
images of snake pit mental hospitals with frightening and dangerous patients. 
In order to avoid the strictures of the general suicide rule, family members 
bringing a wrongful death action are forced to argue that a loved one was 
acting in a rage or frenzy or was insane at the time of the suicide. The reality 
is that the most common description of the mental state of those who have 
attempted suicide is that they did not want to die; they just wanted the pain 
they were experiencing to stop,305 a seemingly rational decision to a person 
who otherwise sees no realistic end to the pain he or she is suffering. 
Moreover, continued use of the term “irresistible impulse” rightly or wrongly 
often suggests to courts the idea that the decedent simply “snapped” or was 
unable to control his actions.306 In fact, modern psychiatric understanding of 
 
 300 Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (citing OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881)). 
 301 Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1324 (2017); see also Eric 
T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 503 (“Tort law has long had close ties to 
community values and standards and to shifting concepts of public morality.”). 
 302 See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 185–86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) (“The word 
‘insanity’ has no definite legal meaning.”); Pamela A. Wilkins, Competency for Execution: The 
Implications of a Communicative Model of Retribution, 76 TENN. L. REV. 713, 722 (2009) (noting that 
“insanity is a legal rather than a medical concept”). 
 303 See generally Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 434, 445 (D.S.C. 2016) 
(questioning whether the term “insanity” is “meaningful or appropriate” in the context of a suicide case). 
 304 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 305 See Chandler, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 306 See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency of courts to view 
premeditation as evidence that the act of suicide was not the result of an irresistible impulse). 
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suicide suggests that the decision to take one’s life often occurs over an 
extended period of time.307 
In short, the continued use of the “rage or frenzy” terminology furthers 
stigmatization and misunderstandings associated with suicide, mental 
illness, and depression.308 This is especially troubling at a time when there is 
increasing acceptance of the idea that suicide is a public health problem that 
needs to be addressed through increased research and prevention.309 
IV. TOWARD A COHERENT APPROACH TO SUICIDE CASES 
Most of the special causation rules regarding suicide in tort law are 
outdated and problematic in their application. It is time for courts to 
reevaluate these rules in light of changing conditions. Drawing upon several 
fairly recent decisions in the area, the following Part of the Article proposes 
alternative rules in the negligence and intentional tort contexts. These 
alternative approaches seek to give effect to standard foreseeability and 
scope-of-risk analyses and reflect modern understandings of suicide, 
including its public dimensions, while also recognizing the special and 
sometimes unpredictable nature of suicide. 
A. Negligence 
In the negligence context, courts need to abolish the blanket rule that 
suicide is a superseding cause. Courts also need to eliminate the unhelpful 
and harmful rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception altogether. But 
courts can continue to recognize the exceptional and usually unforeseeable 
nature of suicide in other ways. 
1. Establishing a Default Position and Recognizing 
Special Circumstances 
While most courts continue to apply the general rule that suicide acts as 
an unforeseeable superseding cause, some courts are beginning to move 
beyond rote application of the suicide rule and its exceptions and toward a 
more traditional scope-of-risk analysis.310 Implicit in these decisions is the 
 
 307 See Schwartz, supra note 161, at 234 (explaining that the tendency of courts to confine “the 
definition of uncontrollable impulse to a sudden frenzied act . . . does not comport with modern medical 
knowledge of mental illness” (footnote omitted)). 
 308 Similar concerns over stigma and stereotypes exist regarding the M’Naghten rule in criminal law. 
See Scott E. Sundby, The Virtues of a Procedural View of Innocence—A Response to Professor Schwartz, 
41 HASTINGS L.J. 161, 168 (1989) (noting the stigma attached to a finding of insanity under M’Naghten). 
 309 See Carey, supra note 16 (discussing suicide in terms of a public health issue). 
 310 See Halko v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[T]he 
most recent trend is to place less emphasis on the mental state and more on the causal connection.”); see 
also Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 575 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming trial court’s denial of 
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recognition that traditional foreseeable scope-of-risk analysis is sufficient to 
address the vast majority of these cases without relying upon the fiction that 
suicide is a superseding cause as a matter of law. For example, where a driver 
negligently rear-ends another driver, resulting in physical injuries that 
eventually allegedly lead to suicide, suicide is simply not the kind of harm 
the defendant foreseeably risked through her negligence.311 We do not need 
a special “suicide rule,” with all of its attendant shortcomings, to tell us this. 
But also implicit in the decisions that are willing to actually take the 
proximate cause element seriously in suicide cases is the reality that 
sometimes suicide is a foreseeable consequence of a defendant’s negligence. 
A 2016 opinion by a federal court in South Carolina provides a useful way 
of viewing the issue. After reviewing the decisional law in South Carolina 
on the subject of causation in negligence cases involving suicide, the court 
observed that the cases are “most sensibly read to provide that, under normal 
circumstances, a decedent’s suicide will constitute an intervening event 
which defeats any showing of causation.”312 The general rule “may establish 
a default position,” but it “cannot be applied in every case.”313 In short, 
mechanical application of the suicide rule should not short-circuit proximate 
cause analysis; “[e]ach case must be decided largely on the special facts 
belonging to it.”314 
Courts must be willing to look past the boilerplate of the traditional 
suicide rule and be willing to recognize the special facts that may be present 
that make suicide the kind of harm that the defendant foreseeably risked 
through his negligence. Here, the law concerning the theory of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress provides a useful parallel. 
Courts have long been leery of claims of negligently inflicted emotional 
distress.315 While part of the concern involves the potential for fakery, courts 
 
motion for judgment as a matter of law where decedent had recently attempted suicide on two previous 
occasions); Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1269–70, 1272–73 (Conn. 1997) (affirming jury verdict 
for plaintiff and rejecting application of suicide rule); Wozniak v. Lipoff, 750 P.2d 971, 983 (Kan. 1988) 
(affirming jury verdict for plaintiff based on conclusion that being treated for depression made suicide 
foreseeable); Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 76–77 (N.D. 1994) (“If the patient’s act of 
suicide is a foreseeable result of the medical provider’s breach of duty to treat the patient, the patient’s 
act of suicide cannot be deemed a superseding cause of the patient’s death that breaks the chain of 
causation between the medical provider and the patient, which absolves the medical provider of 
liability.”). 
 311 See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966). 
 312 Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 434, 442 (D.S.C. 2016) (emphasis added). 
 313 Id. 
 314 Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 48 S.E.2d 324, 328 (S.C. 1948) (quoted in Wickersham, 
194 F. Supp. 3d at 441). 
 315 See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. 
REV. 789, 807–08 (2007) (noting courts’ concerns with recognizing such claims). 
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have also expressed a concern that has helped drive the recognition of the 
suicide rule: the fear of expansive liability.316 Originally, courts refused to 
permit recovery for emotional distress unless the defendant’s negligence 
resulted in physical impact, there was some type of physical manifestation 
of the distress, or the plaintiff was in the “zone of danger” of physical 
injury.317 Several courts eventually observed that “modern advances made in 
medical and psychiatric science” helped alleviate the concerns underlying 
these special rules.318 Over time, courts began to move away from these 
unrealistic and mechanical rules that foreclosed any real analysis into 
foreseeability319 and began to recognize exceptions permitting recovery 
where the facts presented a greater guaranty that the alleged distress was 
likely to be real and that the distress was actually within the foreseeable 
scope of risk created by the defendant’s negligence.320 These included 
 
 316 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 112, § 54, at 360–61 (5th ed. 1984) (identifying “the danger that 
claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined; and . . . the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy 
and disproportionate financial burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for 
consequences which appear remote from the ‘wrongful’ act” as among the concerns driving courts). 
 317 See Kircher, supra note 315, at 810–16 (discussing various tests). 
 318 Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1983); see also Norboe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
66 Conn. L. Rptr. 112, 126 n.19 (Super. Ct. 2018) (“As medical knowledge advances, the clean distinction 
between a person’s mental and physical condition becomes increasingly blurred.”); James v. Lieb, 
375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1985) (“While physical manifestation of the psychological injury may be 
highly persuasive, such proof is not necessary given the current state of medical science and advances in 
psychology.”); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 443 (Wis. 1994) (“[G]iven the 
present state of medical science, emotional distress can be established by means other than proof of 
physical manifestation.”). 
 319 See, e.g., Knaub v. Gotwalt, 220 A.2d 646, 649 (Pa. 1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (“The rule 
that there must be the mechanical requirement of impact, before recovery will be permitted, charges with 
lowered head against the stone wall of the most elementary phenomena observable practically every 
day.”). 
 320 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 
reporters’ notes cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012). Even among jurisdictions that retain impact as a 
requirement, exceptions are sometimes recognized when the circumstances involved provide a reasonable 
basis for concluding the plaintiff suffered serious emotional harm. State Dep’t of Corr. v. Abril, 969 So. 
2d 201, 202–03 (Fla. 2007) (recognizing exception to impact requirement given the foreseeability that 
emotional distress would result from the failure to ensure the confidentiality of HIV test results); Moresi 
v. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990) (recognizing an exception to the 
physical manifestation requirement where there is “the especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental 
distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not 
spurious”); Ricottilli v. Summersville Mem’l Hosp., 425 S.E.2d 629, 635 (W. Va. 1992) (“[A]n individual 
may recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress [absent accompanying physical injury] upon 
a showing of facts sufficient to guarantee that the emotional damage claim is not spurious.”). Some courts 
went beyond this and decided to apply general negligence principles to such claims, while adopting the 
requirement that the resulting emotional distress be severe. See Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520–
21 (Haw. 1970); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996). 
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situations in which the claimed distress resulted from negligent handling of 
a corpse321 or negligent notification of the death of a loved one.322 
Over time, courts identified other factual scenarios where a defendant 
might foreseeably risk serious emotional distress.323 Eventually, the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts adopted a rule recognizing liability where the 
serious emotional harm resulted from conduct that “occurs in the course of 
specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which 
negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.”324 
Examples of such categories include 
[where] a physician negligently diagnoses a patient with a dreaded or serious 
disease; a physician negligently causes the loss of a fetus; a hospital loses a 
newborn infant; a person injures a fetus; a hospital (or another) exposes a patient 
to HIV infection; an employer mistreats an employee; or a spouse mentally 
abuses the other spouse.325  
The examples included in the Restatement are situations in which the 
circumstances are special enough to allow a jury to conclude that serious 
emotional harm was not only genuine but within the foreseeable scope of 
risk created by the defendant’s negligence.326 
A similar principle should guide the analysis in cases involving 
negligence leading to suicide. Ordinarily, suicide will be outside the 
foreseeable scope of the defendant’s negligence. But where a plaintiff is able 
to introduce evidence that the facts of their situation are such that negligent 
conduct is especially likely to result in suicide, the default rule regarding 
suicide and proximate cause should give way. 
For example, in Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Group, LLP, a 2011 
case from Missouri, a doctor was accused of negligence resulting in the 
suicide of the decedent.327 The complaint alleged that the doctor’s negligence 
while performing spinal surgery resulted in paralysis from the waist down.328 
The resulting pain experienced by the decedent was so severe that the touch 
of a sheet across his legs caused him pain.329 The decedent had a morphine 
 
 321 See Ricottilli, 425 S.E.2d at 635 (discussing this exception). 
 322 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. 
b (listing this example). 
 323 Id. § 47 cmt. f. 
 324 Id. § 47(b). 
 325 Id. § 47 cmt. f. 
 326 A comment emphasizes, however, that the test is not solely one of foreseeability. As an example, 
the comment notes that it might be foreseeable that a doctor who negligently misdiagnoses a celebrity as 
having a fatal disease would cause emotional distress to fans of the celebrity. Id. § 47 cmt. i. 
 327 331 S.W.3d 299 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
 328 Id. at 303. 
 329 Id. 
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pump installed to ease his pain, but this proved unsuccessful.330 Eventually, 
the decedent ended his own life.331 
After the defendant prevailed on his motion for summary judgment in 
the lower court, the Missouri Supreme Court focused on the special causation 
rule applied in suicide cases in other jurisdictions and noted that “[m]odern 
psychiatry supports the idea that suicide sometimes is a foreseeable result of 
traumatic injuries.”332 In the case of those with spinal cord injuries in 
particular, research indicated that individuals with spinal cord injuries are at 
a higher risk of suicide and that those with the form of paralysis that the 
decedent had were at a greater risk of suicide than other categories of 
individuals with paralysis.333 Other studies have similarly found those with 
spinal cord injuries to be at an increased risk of depression and suicide,334 
and much of the popular literature surrounding spinal cord injuries also 
references these concepts.335 In short, suicide does not have the same 
lightning-strike quality among those with spinal cord injuries as it does 
among the general population. As such, a spinal surgeon foreseeably risks 
not only emotional distress as a result of a negligent procedure but arguably 
suicide resulting from that distress.336 
Other courts have taken a similar approach without explicitly labeling 
it as such. For example, in White v. Lawrence, a doctor had treated a patient 
 
 330 Id. 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. at 308. 
 333 See Susan W. Charlifue & Kenneth A. Gerhart, Behavioral and Demographic Predictors of 
Suicide After Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury, 72 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 488, 488 
(1991) (finding that “death from suicide is two to six times more prevalent than in the general population” 
and finding that of 489 deaths of those studied with spinal cord injuries, 9% were due to suicide) (cited 
in Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 308 n.12); Andreas Hartkopp et al., Suicide in a Spinal Cord Injured 
Population: Its Relation to Functional Status, 79 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 1356, 
1356 (1998) (finding that the suicide rate among those with spinal cord injuries “was nearly five times 
higher than expected in the general population” and “that the suicide rate in the group of marginally 
disabled persons was nearly twice as high as the group of functionally complete tetraplegic individuals”) 
(cited in Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 308 n.12). 
 334 See M. J. DeVivo et al., Suicide Following Spinal Cord Injury, 29 PARAPLEGIA 620, 624–25 
(1991) (citing studies showing higher than expected suicide rates among those with spinal cord injuries); 
Zahra Khazaeipour et al., Depression Following Spinal Cord Injury: Its Relationship to Demographic 
and Socioeconomic Indicators, 21 TOPICS SPINAL CORD INJ. REHABILITATION 149, 149 (2015) 
(classifying depression as being highly prevalent among those with spinal cord injuries). 
 335 Tiffiny Carlson, Suicide and SCI: Moving Past the Darkness, SPINALCORD.COM (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.spinalcord.com/blog/suicide-and-sci-moving-past-the-darkness [https://perma.cc/YG4M-
KGK4] (“While a few people with paralysis claim to have never considered it, most people who’ve had 
a spinal cord injury, if they’re being honest with themselves, have.”); Depression and Spinal Cord Injury 
(SCI), ST. LUKE’S, https://www.saintlukeskc.org/health-library/depression-and-spinal-cord-injury-sci 
[https://perma.cc/HZP8-M5UB] (“People with SCI have a higher rate of depression.”). 
 336 See Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 313–14 (concluding that summary judgment in favor of surgeon in a 
wrongful death action was inappropriate where spinal surgery patient died of suicide following surgery). 
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with a host of physical ailments.337 The doctor was aware that the patient was 
also an alcoholic who suffered from severe depression to the point that the 
doctor viewed the patient as a “‘likely candidate’ for suicide.”338 The doctor, 
unbeknownst to the patient, prescribed medication in an attempt to curb the 
patient’s drinking and encouraged the patient’s wife to administer the 
medication covertly.339 The medication made the patient physically sick to 
the point that he went to the emergency room for treatment.340 After being 
released, the patient took his own life.341 
Under the majority approach, the defendant’s suicide would, of course, 
have been treated as a superseding cause that cut off the doctor’s liability. 
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that a jury question 
existed on the issue of proximate cause: 
The record shows that leading risk factors for suicide include physical illness 
and depression. The decedent suffered from both. The plaintiff presented 
medical proof that the decedent’s suicide was reasonably foreseeable from a 
medical standpoint . . . . Both Dr. Pate and Dr. Smith testified that the defendant 
should have reasonably foreseen that secretly prescribing Antabuse to an 
alcoholic and depressed patient would cause severe physical problems and 
could cause the decedent to choose to end his life. The jury could thus find that 
the suicide was the foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence.342 
The White court’s approach is quite similar to the one advanced in this 
Article. The court cited a string of decisions that all held that the decedent’s 
suicide broke the chain of causation.343 One of the cases went so far as to 
hold: 
[W]here a defendant injures another either willfully or negligently and as a 
result of the injury, the injured person commits suicide the act of suicide is, as 
a matter of law, an intervening independent cause if the decedent knew and 
understood the nature of his or her act or the act resulted from a moderately 
intelligent power of choice.344  
But the White court was willing to treat this precedent as establishing more 
of a default rule and conclude, based upon the constellation of special 
circumstances present and the expert testimony presented, that a jury 
question existed as to proximate cause. 
 
 337 975 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tenn. 1998). 
 338 Id. 
 339 Id. 
 340 Id. 
 341 Id. at 527–28. 
 342 Id. at 530. 
 343 Id. 
 344 Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added). 
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What should qualify as the type of evidence necessary to create a jury 
question in this context is incapable of precise definition. In the context of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, some courts have dispensed with 
most of the special requirements associated with such claims and instead 
have adopted a standard negligence approach.345 However, these courts also 
sometimes require that the plaintiff prove the existence of severe emotional 
distress through expert scientific or medical testimony.346 
This same type of evidence may often be necessary in wrongful death 
cases involving suicide to establish not only that the defendant’s negligence 
was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s suicide but that the pain caused by the 
defendant’s negligence made suicide a foreseeable result.347 Science has not 
progressed to the point where it can predict with certainty whether one 
person versus another will commit suicide. But the scientific research and 
understanding of suicide has progressed to where experts can sometimes 
testify authoritatively that the circumstances were such that a particular 
plaintiff was at a statistically greater risk of suicide than the average person 
to the point that suicide was foreseeable.348 Expert testimony may also be 
particularly relevant in some instances, such as in the case of teen suicide 
where neuroscience has provided valuable insight into how the adolescent 
brain develops.349 
In at least some instances, however, the application of common sense 
may be sufficient. So, for example, the fact that an individual suffers from 
depression should not, absent other circumstances, be enough to raise an 
 
 345 Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 
(Tenn. 1996). 
 346 See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766–67 (Haw. 1974); Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446 
(concluding that “claimed injury or impairment must be supported by expert medical or scientific proof”). 
 347 See generally Leong, 520 P.2d at 767 (“While a psychiatrist may not be able to establish a 
negligent act as the sole cause of plaintiff’s neurosis, he can give a fairly accurate estimate of the probable 
effects the act will have upon the plaintiff and whether the trauma induced was a precipitating cause of 
neurosis, and whether the resulting neurosis is beyond a level of pain with which a reasonable man may 
be expected to cope.”). 
 348 See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text (discussing studies finding increased risk of 
suicide in some cases). 
 349 See Andrea MacIver, Suicide Causation Experts in Teen Wrongful Death Claims: Will They Assist 
the Trier of Fact?, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 51, 68–75 (2011) (discussing advancements in neuroscience 
with respect to the adolescent brain and the value of expert testimony on this issue). 
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issue regarding proximate cause.350 But the fact that a defendant is aware that 
the decedent had recently attempted suicide may be.351 
The approach described here may also be employed in cases where the 
alleged negligence involves the failure to prevent suicide. Patton v. Bickford 
is a 2016 case from Kentucky in which an eighth grader committed suicide, 
allegedly as a result of bullying.352 The decedent’s estate filed negligence 
actions against various teachers and administrators who allegedly knew or 
should have known that the child was being bullied but failed to take 
reasonable steps to stop it.353 The lower court granted summary judgment to 
the teachers on the predictable grounds that the child’s suicide was a 
superseding cause that relieved the defendants of liability.354 On appeal, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court applied standard scope-of-risk analysis while also 
taking into account the public dimensions of suicide. The court noted “that 
bullying as a source of torment has been recognized as a foreseeable cause 
of suicide and medical/psychological professionals now widely 
acknowledge this societal concern.”355 Interestingly, in support of its 
conclusion, the court referenced the fact that the Kentucky Board of 
Education’s website contained a letter to teachers noting that “student 
suicides resulting from the bullying and harassment activities of other youths 
have escalated” in recent years.356 Thus, the Board of Education itself viewed 
suicide as a foreseeable result of the failure to prevent bullying. 
Patton is also noteworthy for its recognition of the role tort law can play 
in addressing the public health problem that is suicide. In its decision, the 
court also referenced recent “bullying bills” enacted in Kentucky that 
“mandate[d] that school teachers be trained in suicide prevention policies.”357 
This fact served not only as evidence as to the foreseeability of suicide in the 
case of bullying but also as evidence of a “public policy decision to stop 
bullying in schools.”358 The court was thus able to tie the legislation to the 
policy-driven nature of the proximate cause requirement and the traditional 
 
 350 See Rafferman v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 659 So. 2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) 
(concluding that defendant could not have reasonably foreseen decedent’s suicide despite the awareness 
that decedent had “become ‘visibly and obviously depressed’”). 
 351 Cf. Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 575 (11th Cir. 1997) (“We can think of no other 
facts that would have given school officials more reason to anticipate Shawn’s suicide than Shawn’s two 
recent, overt suicide attempts.”). 
 352 529 S.W.3d 717 (Ky. 2016). 
 353 Id. at 721. 
 354 Id. at 722. 
 355 Id. at 733. 
 356 Id. 
 357 Id. 
 358 Id. 
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role tort law has played in deterring “harmful socially unacceptable behavior 
by imposing liability upon the wrongdoer for the wrong done.”359 
The Patton decision is also noteworthy for what it does not do. One 
possible objection to the approach this Article proposes is that it will lead to 
increased liability. Perhaps. But in addition to raising a jury question as to 
proximate cause, a plaintiff must also ultimately prove that the defendant’s 
actions were a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s suicide. In Patton, the plaintiff 
was unable to meet this burden.360 Without an obvious causal link or expert 
testimony regarding whether the bullying actually caused the suicide, the 
plaintiff was unable to survive summary judgment on the issue of 
causation.361 Thus, Patton serves as a reminder of the difficult road that those 
seeking to recover under a negligence theory face, even without application 
of the suicide rule. 
2. Abolishing the Rage or Frenzy/Delirium or Insanity Exception 
Courts should also abolish the rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity 
exception to the standard suicide rule. The exception is a relic from a time 
when suicide was not well understood, when societal attitudes on the subject 
were quite different, and when suicide remained a crime. The exception has 
always primarily reflected a view of fault or lack thereof on the part of a 
decedent. Now that nearly every state has adopted a system of comparative 
fault, decisions as to the fault of the decedent are better dealt with as part of 
this analysis. Indeed, it is noteworthy that while the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts references some of the decisions involving suicide and proximate 
cause, the rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception does not appear in 
the third Restatement.362 
There are other reasons to abolish the exception. The law can play a 
role as a part of a multidisciplinary approach to the public health problem of 
suicide.363 At a minimum, it should not further misunderstandings that 
 
 359 Id. at 733–34. 
 360 Id. at 736. 
 361 Id. 
 362 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (referencing suicide cases 
and proximate cause but omitting any reference to this exception). 
 363 See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Suicide Prevention: A Public Health 
Issue, https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/asap_suicide_issue2-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9D6-
Q4UF] (discussing the role of multidisciplinary perspectives in public health); SUICIDE PREVENTION RES. 
CTR., Suicide Prevention and Policy Legislation, https://www.sprc.org/sites/default/files/resource-
program/FromthefieldLegislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/L55P-CUFM] (discussing state laws aimed at 
suicide prevention). Tort law has sometimes been used as a means of addressing public health issues. See 
Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J. L. 
MED. ETHICS 224, 225 (2002) (“In recent years, the most ardent proponents of litigation as public policy 
have been public health advocates.”); W. E. Parmet & R. A. Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation, 
21 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 437, 437 (2000) (“Increasingly, individuals and organizations concerned 
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prevent progress. The sense of shame and stigma that often accompanies 
depression and related conditions tends to discourage those who are 
considering suicide from seeking help.364 Aside from crafting legal rules that 
are consistent with the goal of reducing the number of suicides, courts can 
shape the law in ways that do not perpetuate the sorts of stereotypes that 
discourage those with depression or thoughts of suicide from seeking 
treatment. By eliminating the unhelpful and antiquated rage or 
frenzy/delirium or insanity exception, courts can shape the law regarding 
suicide and tort law in a manner that better reflects more modern 
understandings of suicide and its prevention. 
3. Comparative Fault 
Given the fact that most suicides will still remain outside of the scope 
of risk created by a defendant’s negligence under the proposed approach, the 
concerns over expanded liability should be limited. Any remaining concerns 
are largely addressed through application of standard comparative fault 
principles.365 By permitting juries to take the decedent’s own actions into 
account when comparing the relative responsibilities of the parties, courts 
can better respect a jurisdiction’s determinations as to the operation of 
 
about public health have sought to use litigation to further their goals. In other words, courts are now 
being used affirmatively in an effort to make public health policy.”); Stephen P. Teret & Michael Jacobs, 
Prevention and Torts: The Role of Litigation in Injury Control, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 17, 19–20 
(1989) (discussing the role that litigation plays in preventing injuries from dangerous products). 
 364 See Mark E. Hastings et al., Shame, Guilt, and Suicide, in SUICIDE SCIENCE 76–77 (Thomas 
Joiner & M. David Rudd eds., 2002) (“Theory and emerging empirical research indicates that feelings of 
shame are more prominent than guilt in the dynamics leading up to suicidal thoughts and behaviors.”); 
Kimberly Arditte Hall, Interpersonal Risk for Suicide in Social Anxiety: The Roles of Shame and 
Depression, 239 PSYCHIATRY RES. 139, 139 (2016) (analyzing how shame and depression may help to 
explain the relationship between social anxiety and interpersonal suicide risk factors); Maanvi Singh, 
Study: Vast Majority of People Who Are Depressed Do Not Seek Help, NPR (Dec. 2, 2016, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/12/02/504131307/study-vast-majority-of-people-who-
are-depressed-do-not-seek-help [https://perma.cc/7ZYA-5XQE] (noting that the stigma associated with 
depression discourages people from seeking help); Alice G. Walton, Why Are So Many People with 
Depression Not Getting Treatment?, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018, 10:18 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
alicegwalton/2018/02/09/why-are-so-many-people-with-depression-not-getting-treated/#23b810a1b2fb 
[https://perma.cc/BKF2-2A22] (suggesting that one reason why people diagnosed with depression do not 
seek treatment is because of the stigma associated with depression). 
 365 Currently, there are few cases fitting this fact pattern in which the decedent’s fault is considered 
for purposes of comparative fault analysis. See Allison C. v. Advanced Educ. Servs., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
605, 611 (Ct. App. 2005) (involving jury verdict apportioning 2% of fault to teen with psychiatric issues 
who killed himself); Rubin v. Aaron, 594 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (App. Div. 1993) (involving jury verdict 
apportioning 80% of responsibility to negligent defendant). This is undoubtedly because the suicide rule 
effectively dispenses with the majority of claims involving this set of facts. 
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comparative fault principles while also better reflecting modern views 
regarding suicide.366 
Where a defendant’s negligence is alleged to have affirmatively 
contributed to the decedent’s suicide, a jury should be permitted to consider 
the decedent’s own actions when comparing the respective responsibilities 
of the parties. The fact that the decedent’s own actions were the most direct 
cause of death might increase the decedent’s share of responsibility.367 In 
apportioning responsibility, many courts take the position that the plaintiff’s 
contributory negligence must be evaluated by using a subjective standard 
that takes into account the plaintiff’s own mental state, including any mental 
impairments.368 The fact that the decedent had an existing psychiatric 
disability at the time of the suicide may reduce, but not completely eliminate, 
the decedent’s portion of responsibility. Thus, a plaintiff is not forced to 
advocate for the all-or-nothing form of responsibility mandated by the rage 
or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception to the suicide rule, nor is a court 
forced to apply it. Where, however, the decedent’s psychiatric disability truly 
prevented the decedent from understanding the physical nature and 
consequences of his actions,369 the decedent would no longer be at fault at 
all, and comparative negligence principles would not reduce recovery.370 
In cases where the defendant owes a duty to take reasonable measures 
to prevent suicide, the suicide rule has not served as the same sort of 
limitation on a plaintiff’s ability to recover as it has in other cases. Therefore, 
the issue of comparative fault has come up more frequently. The general rule 
that has emerged is that where the decedent was in the custody of the 
defendant—for example, where the decedent was a prisoner or where the 
decedent was a patient confined to a hospital under a suicide watch—the 
 
 366 See generally Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825, 832–36 (Tex. 2013) (citing Texas’s 
proportionate responsibility in support of refusal to apply the “unlawful acts” doctrine to bar recovery 
where decedent died after ingesting heroin). 
 367 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) 
(listing “the strength of the causal connection between the person’s risk-creating conduct and the harm” 
as a relevant consideration in apportioning responsibility). 
 368 See Dodson v. State Dep’t. of Human Servs., 703 N.W.2d 353, 357–59 (S.D. 2005) (discussing 
majority rule of applying the subjective standard); Gray v. Roten, No. W2010-00614-COA-R3-CV, 
2011 WL 236115, at *10 n.10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2011) (citing cases that use the subjective 
standard). 
 369 See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text (discussing this prong of the exception). 
 370 See Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 111 (Iowa 2011) (“Whether a person 
suffering from a mental disease lacks the capacity to be found negligent is generally a question of fact.”); 
Dodson, 703 N.W.2d at 357 (“One whose mental faculties are diminished, not amounting to total insanity, 
is capable of contributory negligence, but is not held to the objective reasonable-person standard.” 
(quoting 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 864 (2005))). 
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decedent’s own actions do not reduce recovery.371 In the noncustodial setting, 
however, normal comparative fault principles typically apply and the 
decedent’s own actions may reduce recovery.372 
B. Intentional Torts 
In the case of an intentional tort resulting in suicide, the current majority 
approach, which requires that the defendant’s conduct be a substantial factor 
in causing the suicide in order for the defendant to be held liable,373 already 
strikes the appropriate balance. Introducing the issue of foreseeability into 
intentional tort analysis is inconsistent with the principles underlying tort law 
and is only likely to lead to confusion. And introducing the suicide rule and 
its exceptions into this area is inadvisable for the reasons discussed 
previously. 
Regardless of the precise formulation of the test,374 the majority 
approach gives effect to the basic tort principle that a defendant who engages 
in intentional wrongdoing is more culpable than one who is merely negligent, 
and should thus not be able to claim the unforeseeability of a negative 
consequence as an excuse for avoiding liability.375 At the same time, by 
requiring that the defendant’s conduct be more than a trivial cause of the 
resulting suicide376 and by requiring that causation usually be established 
through expert testimony,377 courts can effectively check the possibility of 
strict liability. Moreover, the nature of most claims will serve as an inherent 
limitation on the scope of liability. The vast majority of the decisions in the 
area involve the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting 
in suicide.378 The requirement of this claim that the defendant’s conduct be 
extreme and outrageous already serves to limit the number of instances in 
 
 371 See Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16, 18–19 (Ind. 1998); see also Cole v. Multnomah 
Cty., 592 P.2d 221, 223 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); c.f. P.W. v. Children’s Hosp., 364 P.3d 891, 894–95, 898 
(Colo. 2016) (holding that hospital was liable for a patient’s damages resultant from his failed suicide 
attempt because “the hospital [knew he was] actively suicidal, and . . . the admission [was] for the purpose 
of preventing [his] self-destructive behavior”); Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 161, 167 (N.J. 1988) 
(holding that a hospital’s staff members were liable for damages resulting from a patient’s failed suicide 
attempt because they “were aware of her condition, [and] their duty was to prevent [her] self-damaging 
actions”). 
 372 See Mulhern, 799 N.W.2d at 115–16; Maunz v. Perales, 76 P.3d 1027, 1033–34 (Kan. 2003). 
 373 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 374 See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text (discussing variations). 
 375 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 376 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 36 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“When an actor’s negligent conduct constitutes only a trivial contribution to a 
causal set that is a factual cause of harm [in the case of multiple sufficient causes], the harm is not within 
the scope of the actor’s liability.”). 
 377 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 378 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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which defendants may be held liable.379 Assuming courts do not lower the 
bar on this element of an IIED claim, the number of potential claims should 
be fairly limited without having to resort to other, more awkward causation 
standards. 
CONCLUSION 
 The standard suicide rule that applies in negligence and some 
intentional tort cases is based on outdated science and a debatable appraisal 
of society’s views concerning the morality of suicide. The same is true of its 
rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception. The former rule tends to short-
circuit commonsense inquiry into causation while the latter tends to further 
harmful stereotypes. At a time when suicide is increasingly recognized as a 
serious public health issue, courts do a disservice to those impacted by 
suicide by continuing to apply these rules. While the special and often 
unpredictable nature of suicide needs to be taken into account in wrongful 
death actions, tort law already has the tools in place to effectively deal with 
such cases. Courts need only begin using them. 
 
 
 379 See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text. 
